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Chapter one provides a study of Jamaica during the 1970' s.
The outcome of this research and the associated modeling
reveals that Prime Minister Manley's approach to government
had some dire consequences. Chapter two provides a current
view of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) along with some
computer simulations which serve as a basis for future
economic forecasts. The results of this research suggest
several possible courses of action for the present government
under Prime Minister Seaga. Fortunately, under Jamaica's
present leadership, any policy which serves to strengthen the
country economically, will also enhance local U.S. security
interest. Chapter three discusses various aspects of Jamaican
history and culture to investigate the likelihood that, if
given the optimum economic recovery program, it could be
successfully implemented. Finally, chapter four addresses
some overall conclusions about Jamaica's economic future, the
prospects of which appear hopeful under America's current
Caribbean Basin Initiative.
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I. JAMAICA: THE 1970s
This thesis analyzes both the Jamaican economic performance
of the 1970's, as well as, the effect the Caribbean Basis
Initiative is likely to have upon Jamaica's future economic
performance. Particular emphasis is given to how these eco-
nomic developments will impact upon U.S. security interest in
the Caribbean region. U.S. security interest are considered
to be enhanced if free enterprize is allowed to function with-
out fear of massive capital losses due to aggression by any
source. This freedom includes all the various aspects of a
healthy economy such as natural resources, trade routes,
related foreign policy, manpower, health, and education. When
these variables function freely without the need for military
action or military aid, U.S. security interest are considered
to be enhanced.
The first step in this study of the island of Jamaica was
to present an economic analysis of the economy in the 1970's,
under Prime Minister Michael Manley. Afterwhich a current
assessment of the economy and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
will be investigated for further analysis of the problem. The
current analysis uses various computer simulations to deter-
mine which economic factors and programs would be most
effectual in promoting stable economic growth.
Finally, an analysis of the Jamaican culture will be
investigated to determine the likelihood that the people of
Jamaica could adopt the policy recommendations set forth by
this thesis. This final segment is an essential component
of any assessment, the omission of which has in the past
served to undermine many U.S. foreign policy programs.
A. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and developing countries has tended to be volatile and
frequently acrimonious. Recent writings document the con-
troversy, breakdown, and reestablishment of relationship
between the IMF and deficit countries such as Brazil, Ghana,
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Peru and Zaire to name just a few. In
all cases, loan conditionality has been the core of the
dispute. [Ref. 1]
During the late 1970s, Jamaica became one of the Fund's
major problem cases. Twice during the 1977-1980 period, the
Jamaican political leadership broke off negotiations with the
IMF on the grounds that its conditions for balance of pay-
ments support were unnecessarily harsh and socially unac-
ceptable. On the first occasion (January 1977) the crux of
the dispute was the deflationary effects of the exchange rate
devaluation proposed by the Fund. In April 1977, after
unsuccessfully pursuing alternative financing among countries
in both the socialist and capitalist worlds, the Jamaican
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government reversed its position and accepted a stand-by
loan from the IMF. [Ref. 2]
The second episode centered around the failure of the
economy to satisfy some criteria embodied in an Extended Fund
Facility loan agreement made in May 1978. [Ibid] Renego-
tiation of the program broke down over the IMF's requests for
sizable reductions in deficit financed expenditures. At that
time the Jamaican government once more announced its intention
to attempt alternative solutions to its balance of payments
problem.
In rejecting further relations with the IMF, Prime
Minister Michael Manley noted that: [Ref. 3]
1. IMF prescriptions are designed by and for developed
capitalist economies and are inappropriate for
developing economies of any kind;
2. the severe suffering imposed on a developing society
through IMF conditionality is endured without any
real prospect of a favorable economic outcome and
without an adequate foundation of social -welfare
provisions to mitigate the hardships experienced
by the people;
3. the notion that with IMF approval international com-
mercial banking institutions will supplement the funds
made available by the IMF is a fallacy; and
4. the punitive withholding of tranches of foreign ex-
change as a consequence of the failure to meet periodic
IMF tests condemns the defaulting country to a worsening
of the foreign exchange situation which the IMF in-
volvement itself is aimed at improving.
Several important questions arise from this series of
events. How adequate and reasonable was the IMF stabilization
program in Jamaica? How feasible were the alternative
11
adjustment policies? And what is the feasibility of a
country such as Jamaica pursuing Third World socialism while
simultaneously submitting itself to a Fund stabilization
program? While this chapter deals largely with the first
issue, the other two questions are shown to be closely
related.
In general, IMF prescriptions for developing countries
have been criticized on the grounds that they are both
inadequate and inequitable. Specifically: [Ref. 4]
1. The package of stabilization measures prescribed by
the IMF for countries with balance of payments deficits
required these to accept a credit squeeze to reduce
the money supply, reduced public spending particularly
on welfare services, reduced real wages, liberalized
price controls, the encouragement of private foreign
investment and the substitution of devaluation for
tariffs and direct controls over trade.
2. The IMF claims to have a scientific basis for these
policies and to be an objective and neutral institution
charged with the technical function of helping countries
to overcome their financial difficulties. Available
evidence, including internal Fund documentation, points
the other way. This contradiction is particularly
clear when the Fund addresses Third World countries*
balance of payments problems.
3. The IMF is not scientific because its analytical
approach and policy prescriptions ignore the structural
and inevitable nature of payments disequil ibria that
result from the development process. Its instruments
were never designed to cope adequately with the
development deficit problems of Third World countries,
or with "shock" deficits arising out of sudden and
unforeseen adverse turns in their import costs or
export incomes. These phenomena are now qualitatively
and quantitatively different from when the IMF was set
up. To continue considering them as temporary situ-
ations, susceptible to correction through monetary
mechanisms, highlights the analytical irrelevance of
the Fund's policy approaches. The resulting performance
tests which the Fund imposes upon deficit countries
12
lack scientific basis. Yet failure to comply with
these tests, and the consequent penalties, disrupt
economic life and politically discredit governments
in Third World countries.
4. The IMF is not neutral because it systematically bases
its prescriptions on market ideology, giving the pre-
ponderant role to local private enterprise and trans-
national investment. It envisages the state in a .
restrained and subsidiary role, promoting the free
play of national and international market forces.
The principle of state participation and intervention,
involving a significant presence of public enterprises
is anathema to it. Alternative development patterns
that reduce or control the space for private market
logic are labelled as inefficient in economic terms
and considered inadequate in political terms.
Many of these criticisms have been specifically cited by Prime
Minister Manley in characterizing his administration's
relationship with the IMF. [Ref. 5]
B. METHODOLOGY
In examining these issues as the relevant merits of
criticisms of IMF policies in Jamaica, it should be borne in
mind that the design of policies for economic stabilization
in Jamaica has been considerably complicated by the dynamic
structure of the country's economic system. Some thirty
years have passed since Phillips [Ref. 6] (1954) first showed
that the application of certain types of "intuitive" stabila-
zation policies to simple multiplier-accelerator macroeconomic
models could result in undesired oscilations or instabilities.
In more complicated macroeconomic models (and in the actual
Jamaican economy) we find below that with complicated lag
structures and the existence of several policy instruments,
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the application of intuitive policies is even more likely to
produce disastrous results. For example, the proper phasing
of fiscal policy (which operates with short time lags) with
monetary policy (operating with long lags) may not result
from intuitive policy judgments and yet is critical to the
success of any stabilization program. It has now become
rather clear from analysis of macroeconomic policy that be-
cause of the dynamic structure of the economy, questions of
both timing and magnitude are essential in formulating policies
and well-intentioned policies may be unexpected and counter-
intuitive results. [Ref. 7]
Therefore, as a first step in analyzing the Jamaican
economy in the 1970s a dynamic simultaneous equation economic
model will be developed. The value of this approach is that
it allows one to treat the economy by taking into account
simultaneously all of the complex interrelationships and
feedback loops that exist between variables. In formulating
or analyzing the stabilization policies of the 1970s, there
has often been a temptation to draw conclusions from indi-
vidual relationships between particular variables of interest,
excluding variables or relationships that have secondary or
indirect effects. This has been dangerous not so much be-
cause it has tended to aggregate or simplify the structure of
the economy but because it has ignored or misrepresented some
aspects of the economy's structure that play an important part
in its system. The Jamaican economy is a complex dynamic
14
system and, as is the case with complex systems, can only be
properly modeled and understood when all of the interre-
lationships between variables are accounted for simultaneously
Even with the aid of an econometric model, policy formu-
lation is a difficult problem and the means of determining
a policy that is in some sense "best" may still be unclear.
Part of the problem is to quantify the objectives of the
policy in a precise way (assuming that the objectives are
indeed known) . Presumably either the IMF or the Jamaican
authorities could embody policy goals and constraints in the
form of an objective "cost" or "utility" functional carried
over the entire time period of the stabilization program. To
be consistent, either the IMF or Jamaican authorities would
then have to proceed to design a policy plan that would result
in the economy (or at least in the econometric model) per-
forming in a way that is optimal with respect to the cost
functional
.
Once a model of the economy has been specified, a computer
simulation can be used to determine and compare the results
of the different IMF or government policies and one could
choose a policy which, though not necessarily optimal, is
better than other policies tried. Trial and error simulation
is, however, an inefficient if not impossible method of
arriving at a policy plan that is optimal, and a more direct
approach is certainly desirable.. The approach developed
below is that of optimal control. In fact, the formulation
15
of short term stabilization policy seems particularly amenable
to optimal control. A goal of this thesis will be to show
that if one can work with a linear or linearized econometric
model of the Jamaican economy, together with a quadratic cost
criteria, then optimal control theory can provide a viable
tool for analyzing and understanding the dynamic properties •
of the Jamaican economy, for formulating stabilization poli-
cies based on the model and for better understanding in a
quantitative way the trade-offs that the Jamaican economic
policy maker and the IMF were faced with during the period
under consideration. Hopefully, this approach will clarify
the issues surrounding the IMF stabilization programs in
Jamaica during the late 1970s.
C. BACKGROUND
Many of the country's economic problems appear to coincide
with the coming to office of the People's National Party (PNP)
administration of Prime Minister Michael Manley (Table I).
Manley was elected to office in 1972, at a time of heightened
political and social tensions due to widening socio-economic
inequalities and perceived foreign dominance over the
economy. [Ref. 8] The PNP instituted a wide-ranging reform
program which won support of the underprivileged classes, but
encountered growing economic problems due in part to the
world economic crisis and in part to what can only be judged
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economic policy. Key indicators of the decline over the PNP
period 1973-80 were:
1. real GNP down by a fifth;
2. manufacturing down 30 percent;
3. construction down 77 percent;
4. net international reserves, minus US$150 million (1981);
5. inflation 27.3 percent (1980);
6. living standards minus 29 percent;
7. crime plus 57 percent.
These statistics were particularly devastating in that
historically Jamaica is anything but a Caribbean Bangladesh.
Even today in the aftermath of the decline, its per capita
GNP of US$1,300 places it well up in the World Bank'list of
middle income countries. During the 1960s, the country had
been doing very well- -its export markets were bouyant and the
multinationals were eager to put money into the country's
resource industries. Average GNP growth was a highly
respectable 4-6 percent. [Ref. 9]
As Brown has indicated, the main characteristics of the
mid-1970s (particularly beginning in 1975) included a highly
unstable political climate; spiralling wages and prolonged
industrial disputes; changes in the structure of government
budget and rapid expansion in government expenditure, and
emigration of persons and capital. According to Brown, [Ref.
10] it is difficult to overestimate the unfavorable effects
of the apparent fragmentation in political direction on
business confidence and economic activity, particularly in
the context of the difficult economic conditions which
prevailed: [Ibid]
18
"It is not at all clear that this instability resulted
from the fact of the initiation of a strategy of democratic
socialism, so much as the manner of its implementation,
the absence of clear policy guidelines and the denigration
of private capital which threatened the security of large
and small businesses. In so far as small businesses are
maintained on the spinoffs or trickle down effects of
the activities created by large businesses, a reduction in
big business activity was soon reflected in lagging activity
in the small business sector."
More importantly, the apparent ambivalence, or even
contradiction, in political strategy was mirrored in the
failure to settle what was in fact a crucial issue of new
economic policy. This is the relation between policies to
redistribute incomes and policies to induce growth. It is
not apparent that the Manley government was ever able to
answer with any kind of quantification issues surrounding
fundamental economic policy, such as: [Ibid]
1. Under what conditions does the attempt or the failure
to redistribute income retard growth?
2. How is the trade off between growth and distribution
affected by the kind and range of policies chosen and
by their timing and implementation?
3. How is the pace of redistribution affected by conditions
for growth and overall rate of growth?
4. What investment strategies and policies are necessary
to support a policy of redistribution and maintain
or increase the growth momentum?
In any case, fiscal policy was decidedly expansionary in
the mid-1970s with government recurrent and capital expenditures
increasing by 61 percent in 1974/75 and then by a further 36
percent in 1975/76 (Table II). Government revenues could not
keep pace with the rapid growth in expenditures, even though



































the Capital Development Fund. In fact, the government spent
its increased bauxite revenues on non- investment activities
aimed at providing greater social services, increased
employment and further public ownership and control of
production rather than on their originally intended use of
investment for structural adjustment in the non-mining sector
of the economy. [Ref. 11] The net result of movements in
expenditures and revenues was an acceleration in the fiscal
deficit, increasing by 108 percent in 1974/75 and 66 percent
in 1975/76.
Coinciding with these trends in the international economy
and domestic policy was the development of a major inter-
national payments problem. The overall balance of payments
[Ref. 12] measured by changes in official reserves, moved
from a surplus of J$36 million in 1971 to a deficit of J$44
million in 1972. Deficits persisted thereafter reaching the
alarming level of J$238 million in 1976. The current account
deficit widened from J$145 million in 1970 to J$275 million
in 1976. Private net capital inflows, which historically
performed an equilibrating role, became increasingly in-
adequate after 1970 and practically ceased by 1976. For
awhile, government foreign borrowing helped to offset the
decline in private capital inflows, but in 1977 government
debt payments exceeded new debt inflows by J$5 million. As
a consequence of these trends, the economy rapidly lost
international reserves. Net foreign assets of the central
21
bank amounted to J$137 million in 1910, contracted somewhat
during the next two years, recovered to $141 million in 1974
and then fell sharply and continuously. By December 1977,
net foreign reserves were minus J$171 million. The large
negative foreign reserve balance was the net outcome of a
reduction of gross foreign reserves from J$168 million in
1974 to J$43 million in 1977 and a growth of gross foreign
liabilities from zero in December 1972 to J$214 million in
December 1977.
Fiscal policy* or the rapid growth of government con-
sumption expenditures (Tables III, IV) must be considered a
major factor underlying Jamaica's trade and payments problem.
[Ref. 13] As Girvan, et. al . [Ref. 14] have noted:
"Government expenditure grew at an extremely high rate,
averaging 32 percent per annum in the five financial years
from 1972/3 to 1976/ 77 . . . . The growth in expenditure was
partly due to deliberate Keynesian inspired fiscal
expansion, the effect of inflation on recurrent expenditure,
lack of strict financial accountability in the state
bureaucracy and political pressures. Contradictions within
the ruling PNP led to a tendency to alleviate the social
effects of the crisis by increased expenditure, rather
than tackling the underlying structural problems, and the
political pressures of an election year (1976) contributed
to the failure to control public expenditures."
The excess demand for consumer, intermediate and capital
goods that could not be met from local production or imports,
resulted in higher domestic prices and shortages. Sub-
stantially higher real wages added to the costs of production
and, together with domestic inflation and a fixed exchange
rate, squeezed profit margins and discouraged the production
of exports and inflow of foreign investment. Given a constant
22
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exchange rate, a growing consumption rate and the exemption
of government transactions from most import restrictions,
excess demand for imports by the private sector is likely to
have increased during this period. [Ref. 15]
According to Bonnick [Ref. 16 [, however, "it is difficult
and probably impossible to quantify the effect of the pressure
of domestic demand on Jamaica's current account deficit."
His reason for such a conclusion is that, [Ibid] "the impact
of growing demand on the deficit will depend on what is
happening to the regime of tariffs and/or the more restrictive
the import quotas, the more the pressure of domestic demand
results in higher prices and/or shortages rather than higher
imports." It is a fact that after 1972 Jamaica not only
increased tariffs and intensified quantitative restriction,
but moved to a system of import quotas within an overall
ceiling on imports. This system increasingly insulated the
current accounts from the pressures of domestic demand.
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies did, however,
contribute to inflation in this period. The annual increase
in total domestic credit (Table V) far exceeded the growth of
GDP in current and constant prices and this was mainly the
result of the rapid growth in public sector credit to finance
the widening fiscal deficits and ambitious public spending
program. The overall fiscal deficit (excess of domestic
recurrent and capital revenues over expenditures) increased
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and that up until 1975 much of the deficit was financed by
external public borrowing. At the same time, domestic credit
to the government sector expanded five fold in 1971-76, and
the share of domestic credit going to the public sector more
than doubled from 14 percent to 35 percent of total domestic
credit over the same period.
It is obvious that a very large number of factors led to
the deterioration in Jamaica's balance of payments. The
causes were undoubtedly both external and internal , for
example, the exogenous worsening in the country's terms of
trade or the inappropriate stance of domestic policies in the
1970s which resulted in an excessively rapid expansion of
aggregate domestic demand.
As noted, there is considerable dispute in the Jamaican
literature [Ref. 17] concerning the relative importance of
the contributions of internal and external factors to that
country's economic instability during the 1970s. It can
hardly be disputed that during the past decade exogenous
factors--the four fold rise in energy prices in 1973-74, the
weak economic performance of the industrial economies since
1974 and the further increase in energy prices in 1979-80
were major contributors to the country's adjustment problems.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that a combination of
inflationary demand management policies, restrictions on
trade and payments, and rigid exchange rate policies also
contributed to a cumulative loss of competitiveness and
consequent balance of payments difficulties.
27
It is particularly important to examine these causes of
Jamaica's balance of payments problems since the appropriate
cure for disequilibrium depends on whether the origin is
exogenous or endogenous to the domestic economy. [Ref. 18]
The macroeconomic model developed below is an attempt to
quantify these relationships.
D. CONSIDERATIONS IN MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
As with Jamaica, most developing countries have at one
time or another faced the twin problems of a high domestic
rate of inflation and a deficit in the balance of payments.
As noted, in Jamaica's case during the 1970s, the cause of
at least part of these problems can be traced to increased
government fiscal deficits that resulted in excessive monetary
expansion which in turn increased domestic demand. One
purpose of the stabilization programs was to reduce these
pressures. Both Jamaican and IMF policy makers recognized
that the implementation of these programs would have simul-
taneous effects on output, inflation and the balance of
payments. While attempts were made to make allowances for
these effects in qualitative terms, relatively little was
known in the Jamaican context about the precise quantitative
nature of the relationships among these major economic aggre-
gates. This lack of knowledge of course created considerable
problems when policy makers wished to assess the effects of
a particular policy initiative- -for example, a devaluation of
28
the Jamaican dollar. .Similarly, lack of information on the
impact and interaction of many macroeconomic variables made
it difficult to derive the appropriate policy objectives to
achieve specific stabilization objectives.
This point is important because it is not clear that the
IMF, prior to introducing the stabilization programs in the
late 1970s, had undertaken any quantitative macro-analysis
of the main economic forces at work in Jamaica. What follows
is an attempt to identify the key elements in the IMF's
approach to the Jamaican economy, together with an analysis
of some of the apparent limitations to the Fund's method of
stabil izat ion
.
The IMF analysis of the mid- to-late- 1970s economic crisis
can be gleaned from the various reports done by the Fund on
the Jamaican economy. [Ref. 19] In general, the reports
reflect the Fund's usual monetarist approach to the balance
of payments problem. Four major causes of the crisis are
identified by the Fund:
1. excessive demand,
2. excessive monetary expansion,
3. overvalued exchange rate, and
4. excessive wage charges.
It is clear from monetarist logic that all four elements are
connected. The scenario emerging is that the monetary ex-
pansion resulting from the government's deficit spending led
to excessive demand mainly for imports. Secondly, the
excessive wage increases apart from increasing consumption
29
of imports, led to an overvalued currency thus reducing the
country's competitiveness. This, according to the IMF, is
what led to the reduction in export receipts and the increase
in imports thus causing the balance of payments crisis.
The IMF's analysis of the crisis of the Jamaican economy
is set out in its July 1977 report on the economy which
accompanied the request for a Stand-by arrangement. [Ref. 20]
After briefly stating that "Jamaica has been facing a serious
balance of payments crisis since 1972" the Fund's analysis
concludes that "at the root of these difficulties was a
rapidly growing government deficit," and concurrently with
this growing deficit the document goes on to note that "there
was a sharper wage push which led to increases in cost that
exceed by substantial margins the increases in those of
Jamaica's trading partners, putting into serious jeopardy the
competitiveness of the economy."
The Fund therefore took the view that developments in the
world economy played little if any role in the crisis of the
economy. [Ref. 21] To develop this position further and to
be consistent with the traditional IMF position, the analysis
stated that government expenditure to cure the unemployment
situation, which rose from 12 percent to 23 percent between
1962 and 1972, "while it did assist in increasing employment,
it did not lead to any increase in domestic production and
set in motion serious demand pressures reflected in balance
of payments deficits." [Ref. 22]
30
In general, IMF policies outlined below emphasized speedy
adjustment, defined in terms of external balance through
reductions in domestic incomes and expenditures. The various
monetary conditions were seen by the Fund as a means to this
end.
For purposes of this analysis, the Jamaican government's
involvement with the IMF began in 1977. Net foreign reserves,
which stood at J$138.6 million at the end of June 1975 and
which fell to J$58.5 at the end of December, fell further to
minus J$1.9 million in March 1976, and by the end of September
of that year were as low as minus J$102 million. As repeated
attempts to increase official inflows failed, the government
finally came to terms with the IMF and signed a two year
Stand-by facility in July-August 1977. On balance, the
government appeared to have settled on terms which reflected
its own policies. In particular, the dual exchange rate was
maintained as were price controls and subsidies. Employment
and social welfare programs were not fundamentally altered.
Wage policy, however, required reductions in the rate of wage
increases under loose wage guidelines, rather than a freeze
on wages.
Under this agreement, a total of US$79.6 million would be
available over the two years to June 1979. Given either the
usual level of inflows or the external financing actually
required, it could not be assumed that the amount of finance
under the IMF program would be adequate to stimulate economic
31
recovery. Rather, the fact of the agreement was expected to
be the lever for additional inflow under the auspices of the
IMF.
The agreement was circumscribed by tests relating to:
1. net foreign assets of the central bank;
2. net banking system credit to the public sector and
outstanding arrears; and
3. limits to new external medium and long term borrowing.
This agreement was terminated in December 1977 when the target
for domestic credit expansion was not met.
Brown has concluded that the failure of this program was
due to the fact that the economy was in a slump and capital
was flowing out. The program's curtailing of aggregate demand
worsened the slump while interest rate policies had no effect
on stemming capital inflows or inducing net inflows. "Further
the merchandise account was already subject to direct controls
Foreign exchange controls as well as controls over foreign
borrowing and in the domestic market were also in effect.
The agreement on the details of monetary policy, including
the limits on new public external borrowing as well as the
absence of any policies to induce investment meant that the
effective model was the IMF model. The point of the IMF tests
was to reinforce this, whatever else appeared to have been
allowed. The only way out was to raise the level of in-
vestment. But the government had no investment policy and
monetary policy further depressed private domestic investment,
especially in small business." [Ref. 23]
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At the end of 1977, there was a drastic decline in the
current account deficit. Merchandise imports were less than
merchandise exports, at very low levels of capital inflows.
This was itself a problem "since production could not recover
at the level of imports." The decline in reserves was J$14.6
million compared with a decline of over J$42 million at the
end of 1976. "The problem however remained one of low
activity, the falling rate of investment, and increasing
capital outflows." [Ibid]
Negotiations were initiated for a new agreement with the
IMF. This was signed in May 1978. This new agreement under
the Extended Fund Facility, was applicable to a higher credit
tranche and required more rigid conditions. The agreement
covered a three year period and allowed a total of US$240
million.
The terms included:
1. unification of the dual exchange rates, and a devalu-
ation of 15 percent at the beginning of the program
and monthly mini-devaluations of one to one and one
half percent for twelve months;
2. price liberalization and limitations on wage increases
(including overtime and fringe benefits) to a maximum
of 15 percent over the first two years;
3. increased taxes to yield J$180 million in fiscal year
1978/79, a reduction in government expenditure to
yield current account savings equal to 21 percent of
capital outlays, increased prices of public utilities;
4. the monetary measures instituted to ensure meeting
the tests and in particular the net domestic assets
test were:
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a. amendment of the Bank Act to allow the commercial
banks' liquid assets ratio to be raised to 40
percent, with the period of notice reduced to
fifteen days from thirty;
b. a ceiling equal to 10 percent above the amount
in May 1978 on commercial banks' loans and advances
to the private sector; this was further reduced to
5 percent early in 1979;
. c. commercial banks to be required to set aside cash
reserves to the equivalent of foreign payments
arrears and pending payments with an exchange rate
guarantee
.
Selective exchange rate guarantees were also suspended.
This was clearly a deflationary program. The emphasis was on
reducing domestic consumption and increasing exports, so as
to improve the external account. Wage restraint and a series
of monthly mini-devaluations which were scheduled to run
until May 1979 were expected to improve the competitiveness
of the export sector. A necessary assumption was that net
capital inflows would increase considerably.
The stabilization program planned for a fall in public
and private consumption expenditures and an increase in fixed
investment expenditures as a percentage of GDP. [Ref. 24]
Gross investment was projected to increase from 10.4 percent
to 21.8 percent of GDP over the three year program period and
government capital expenditure was to be financed not by
credit creation but by appropriate increases in the government
and private sector's savings ratios.
Government revenue was planned to increase from 22.5
percent of GDP to 28.1 percent, and government current
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expenditure to decline from 23.7 percent to 20.2 percent.
Correspondingly, it was intended that the budget deficit
would decrease from 13.4 percent to 4.5 percent and government
savings would increase from minus 1.3 percent of GDP to 7.9
percent. By imposing wage guidelines which limited increases
in gross labor remuneration to 15 percent per annum over a
two year period, and by decontrolling prices, the program
sought to increase the level and the share of profits thereby
augmenting domestic financing capacity. In addition, the
removal of subsidies from goods and services produced by the
public enterprises and corresponding increases in their prices
were intended to reduce public consumption and improve the
profitability of public enterprises. Altogether, the program
planned for an increase in domestic financing of investment
as a proportion of GDP from 7.6 percent in 1978 to 19.4 per-
cent in 1981. Greater dependence on foreign financing of
gross accumulation was not envisaged.
In May 1979, and after the tests were met, the government
requested a revision of the agreement in order to obtain
financing under the Supplementary Financing Facility. The
terms which were similar to those under the 1978 agreement
included limits on new external borrowing (Table VI).
By September 1979, it was clear that there would be
difficulty in meeting the targets. Domestic credit expansion
to support the government budgetary deficit had exceeded
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IMF centered on ways to retrieve the situation. Drawings
under the Extended Fund Facility were interrupted pending
the outcome of the negotiations. In March 1980, the govern-
ment opted to break off negotiations with the Fund.
Brown's interpretation of the background to the foreign
exchange crisis as well as the explanation of the slump in
domestic economy provides some understanding of the failure
of the program to effect improvement in the domestic economy:
"Consumption and real output declined while price increases
exceeded those of the mid-1970s. That neither investment nor
net capital inflows increased could hardly have been
unexpected. The economy was depressed and the improvement in
the merchandise account which had occurred since 1977 was due
to the control of imports and the reevaluation of export
receipts, consequent on devaluation. The overall balance on
current account worsened in spite of continuing increases in
net receipts from foreign travel as investment income and
other current account inflows increased." [Ref. 25]
It has also been argued that the amount of foreign ex-
change supplied in support of the IMF program was unrelated
to either the size of the deficit or to the conditions
governing the capacity for adjustment. Yet, the extent of
financing available can determine the speed of adjustment and,
therefore, the extent of the necessary decline in income.
"The inadequacy of IMF balance of payments support, combined
with the conditions which were imposed serve to force the
pace of adjustment." [Ref. 26]
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Critics contend that the Jamaican experience supports the
view that the relative inadequacy of balance of payments
support, coupled with the existence of an arbitrariness in-
volved in the use of the tests, in fact reduced the policy
choices available to the country and are an important means
of imposing IMF economic strategy. According to this view,
the IMF attempted to impose an export-led strategy, and the
policies therefore implied a shift of resources towards
export. The government was in fact trying to change this
strategy largely because of the income and investment concen-
tration associated with previous policies. At the same time,
however, government policy offered no comprehensive set of
measures aimed at effecting these changes. This no doubt
limited the negotiating leverage which the government might
have had. So far as can be ascertained, for example, the
policies adopted in the 1977 agreement maintained the main
points of the government program.
The major points at issue in the Fund's programs appear
to have been the exchange rate, wage policy and fiscal
expenditure. These were all important adjustments to the
policy framework of the IMF. "Their effectiveness was, how-
ever, reduced by the monetary measures with which they were
combined by the structure of the government's expenditures
as it related to investment and the creation of investment
opportunities and the failure to use rising wages as a mean
to increase investment. Once that was the case, the aggregate
money model became the operative part of the program. The
tests then only reinforced the rigidity of the model."
[Ref. 27]
Based on the above analysis of the Fund's experience in
Jamaica, several conclusions can be drawn for the purpose of
constructing a macroeconomic model of the economy.
First, most economists would probably accept the general
proposition put forth by the IMF that monetary expansion will
not only create inflationary pressures and cause the balance
of payments to deteriorate but also, particularly when it is
unanticipated, increase real income. However, the actual
operation of the transmission mechanism in developing
countries such as Jamaica and the relative size and timing
of the effects of a change in policy are a matter of
considerable doubt.
Second, there is not extensive literature on some of the
more important individual macroeconomic relationships. For
example, substantial work has been done in the context of
developing countries on the links between monetary growth
and inflation, [Ref. 29] and between money and the balance of
payments. [Ref. 30] A relatively smaller number of empirical
studies have also been made of the relationship between money
and growth. [Ref. 31] However, systematic analysis of these
various relationships for Jamaica is only at the very pre-
liminary stages. Models have been specified and estimated
[Ref. 32] for the country but it is difficult to generalize
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these results because of differences in model specification,
estimation methods and periods of estimation. [Ref. 33]
Third, as noted there has been only limited formal
quantitative analysis of the effects that a stabilization
program may have on the Jamaican economy. This of course has
considerable implications for the IMF's lending operations in
Jamaica since the relationships just mentioned figure pro-
minently in the stabilization programs that have been agreed
to by the Jamaican government.
On the basis of the above considerations, evaluation of
the IMF programs in Jamaica together with the criticisms of
these efforts, requires a macroeconomic model with a framework
where there is a fairly well-defined relationship between
money, the balance of payments and domestic prices, in which
the supply of and demand for money play a central linking
role. The effects of policies on the real sector should also
be treated explicitly.
If feedbacks from real output can be taken into con-
sideration, the analysis should be able to determine whether
a given financial program will have undesirable consequences
for growth and employment, something that has particularly
concerned Jamaican policymakers and commentators.
Generally treating output as independent of monetary or
credit factors has been rationalized on the grounds that the
typical IMF-type stabilization program is essentially of a
short term nature and that in the short run one can assume
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that the domestic supply of resources is effectively fixed.
There is some empirical evidence supporting this view. For
example, Richman and Stillson, [Ref. 34] after examining a
number of Fund Stand-by arrangements over the period 1965-72,
conclude that "one cannot observe a systematic relationship
between the introduction and implementation of programs and
rates of growth in the short run." This conclusion, however,
does not distinguish between the rate of growth of capacity
output and the rate of capacity utilization, and the latter
could be affected even in the short run. Furthermore, in
view of the extension of the time span of Stand-by ar-
rangements that occurred in Jamaica, this rationale can no
longer be relied upon. In short, the growth problem must be
explicitly introduced into the model.
The above analysis of the Fund's program in Jamaica also
showed that while the principal objectives of the stabili-
zation program may be reduce the inflation rate and improve
the country's external payments position, the policies
followed will have repercussions on the other variables in
the economy, some of which may be desirable and some not.
Yet these other effects have been clearly major concerns of
Jamaican policymakers. For example, restrictive monetary
policies may have involved an unwanted temporary loss of
output, even though eventually these policies significantly
reduced inflation and improved the balance of payments.
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As another example, it has been argued that as real
output and income continued to fall in the late 1970s the
deflationary measures introduced, while restricting imports,
failed to improve the balance of payments since there was a
corresponding deterioration of the capital account and associ-
ated investment income account. "The capital account re-
flected instability which was only worsened by repeated
deflationary measures. Each round of income reduction would,
therefore, necessitate new deflationary measures as capital
inflows failed to increase and outflows on current and capital
accounts continued." In short, although the deflationary
measures were designed to restore stability by restraining
aggregate demand and thereby reduce inflation the crux of the
problem was the failure of investment which was itself related
to the decline in capital inflow. [Ibid]
The size of this loss of output and the period over which
it occurred was of overriding importance to the authorities
in Jamaica from both economic and social perspectives. In
fact, it is possible to argue that the Fund's programs of
deflationary policy had little initial effect on prices, but
caused a substantial slowdown in the growth of real income
and employment. Such a result if it did in fact occur would
depend on the relative sizes of the various parameters in
the system and the time lags involved in the response of
variables to policy changes. The question that arises is
whether there were any combinations of private sector
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behavior and government policy that possibly gave rise to.
this result in the Jamaican context.
For example, it is possible in the Jamaican case that
some of the decline in income in the 1970s was the result of
the simultaneous attempt of the government to step up the
pace of income redistribution while counteracting the effects
of the external account on total income and employment (at a
time when capital inflows were being reversed and real output
growth was negative). It is likely that there were not
sufficient policy instruments to meet all these objectives
at the same time. Brown has argued that the limitations on
the range of effective policy instruments was partly a
consequence of the structure of the economy and of the
development policies which had been pursued since the 1950s.
"Of particular importance was the constraint imposed by the
requirements of an industrialization program based on imports
and capital inflows. Since maintaining growth dynamic depends
on the flow of imports, the attempt to control the balance of
payments deficit directly through the merchandise account can
often only be achieved in the short run at the expense of
maintaining the stimulus to growth. Further, since the flow
of imports depends on capital inflows, an important priority
of balance of payment policy must be to maintain stability in
the capital account." [Ref. 35]
Quantification of the issues discussed above requires a
dynamic model that can simultaneously capture the major
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relationships between prices, the balance of payments and
output. The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to
propose a formal framework for examining these interrelations,
and more important, to use this framework to analyze the
effects of policy changes on all these variables. In a sense,
the model can be viewed as providing one particular inter-
pretation of the basic theoretical paradigm underlying the
Fund's stabilization program in Jamaica. Within the context
of the simple dynamic model developed here, questions
regarding the effect stabilization programs on resource
utilization in both the short run and the long run can be
handled. Such an analysis is important, since the time pat-
tern that the variables follow during the course of a
stabilization program may in the Jamaican context have been
just as crucial as the positions they ultimately reached.
The model proposed here, although highly aggregated and
simple in structure, is nevertheless able to meet this main
requirement. It stresses the crucial role played by the
demand for money and monetary disequilibrium in the behavior
of such major macroeconomic variables as prices, output and
the balance of payments. Thus, the analysis can be considered
a generalization of the models developed in the context of
the monetary approach to the balance of payments and is also
consistent with the philosophy underlying the financial pro-
gramming approaches followed by the Fund. Perhaps as
important, it attempts to quantify the extent to which
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external factors may have significantly undermined the
government's stabilization attempts. Also, the model differs
from the usual monetarist approach to the balance of payments
in two important regards. First, a distinction is made be-
tween the current account balance and the overall balance.
Second, to determine the interaction between government
policy and private sector response, several factors linking
government and private expenditures are introduced.
While monetary factors are assigned a major role in the
model, it is explicitly recognized that the money supply is
not necessarily under the close control of the Jamaican
authorities. By definition, the domestic money equals the
net foreign assets of the consolidated banking system plus
bank credit to the government and the private sector. As is
well established, in a small open economy operating under a
system of fixed exchange rates (which is a description that
would fit Jamaica during this period) , changes in the money
supply can be brought about through movements in the balance
of payments.
Furthermore, since Jamaica lacks a developed capital
market, the growth of domestic credit may be closely linked
to the government's borrowing requirements and hence to its
fiscal policy. In this model, fiscal policy (specifically
expenditures) is the relevant policy instrument by which the
authorities seek to achieve their objectives and it is the
the domestic component of the money stock that is the
outgrowth of these policy actions.
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E. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The estimated model contains thirteen behavioral equations
Such simplicity was dictated mainly by a desire to focus on
the general aspects of the issues considered here and to
develop an analysis that is applicable specifically to the
Jamaican economy. [Ref. 36] Any attempt to construct a more
disaggregarted model for the country would immediately run
into the constraints of the limited availability of data.
[Ref. 37]
Essentially, this model describes an economy that is:
1. small relative to the rest of the world;
2. open to international trade and financial flows;
3. maintains a pegged exchange rate- -this does not mean
that the exchange rate cannot be altered, but only
that it is policy determined, and
4. characterized by a relatively underdeveloped financial
sector. This specifically implies that the number of
financial assets that could substitute for money
holdings is very limited, and/or that the authorities
control the interest rates of those assets that are
available
.
The stochastic equations of the model explain inflation,
the overall balance of payments, the fiscal budget (i.e.,
government expenditure and revenues), output, money supply
domestic credit, the current account, government and private
sector consumption and investment.
1 . Inflation
The specification for price changes is an extension
of the monetary disequilibrium model of Goldman [Ref. 38] to
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(1) INFC = a
1
[MIPL-MIPd ]
a- [CPIL-EXAE-USCPI-b ] +
2 o
J
a, [GEXAE-USCPI] + C
±
Where
INFC = the Jamaican rate of inflation
(consumer price index.
EXAE = Jamaican exchange rate in units of
Jamaican dollars per US dollar.
USCPI = United States consumer price index.
MIP = stock of real money balances (MI)
deflated by the Jamaican consumer
price index.
L = lagged one year.
GExAE = the rate of growth of EXAE.
The superscript d denotes demand.
On the simplifying assumption that the country's
equilibrium exchange rate did not change secularly, b may
be used as a parameter rather than varying over time. If
there is no excess demand for real money balances and domestic
prices are equal to their equilibrium level b
,
then with the
exchange rate fixed, the rate of Jamaican inflation will be
equal to the rate of inflation prevailing in the United
States (the country's major trading partner). This result
of course assumes that Jamaican policymakers always attempt
to keep their country's prices in line with those charged in
the United States.
Divergences from this equilibrium relationship can
arise from two sources:
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1. Any expansion of the money stock that results in an
excess supply of real money balances will (in the next
period) create inflationary pressures that tend to
eliminate the disequilibrium in the money market.
2. If domestic prices are pushed away from the equilibrium
level, for whatever reason, they will move in the
direction that restores the relationship.
In a sense, the second term in equation (1) represents
a type of "catch up" effect to any erosion that may occur in
the country's international competitiveness.
Feeding into equation (1) is the stock demand for
real money balances. Here we follow the standard literature
[Ref. 39] in relating money demand to received income (GDPNP)










This formulation which is typically used for de-
veloping countries [Ref. 40] differs from theoretical models
in excluding the rates in interest on other financial assets
from affecting money demand. This follows directly from the
aforementioned assumption regarding the paucity of financial
alternatives to money in Jamaica. The relevant substitution
in the country is therefore between money and goods, or real
assets with the opportunity cost being the expected rate of
inflation.
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) leads to
the equation in its estimating form:
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2 . Balance of Payments
The overall balance of payments, as represented by
the change in the stock of international reserves (in terms
of domestic currency) is specified as a positive function of
the excess demand for nominal money balances and a negative
function of the deviation of the domestic price level from
its purchasing power parity equilibrium.





Where &R = the change in the net stock of
international reserves.
MI = nominal stock of narrow money.
In equation (4) variations in the domestic currency
value of foreign exchange reserves that are due solely to
exchange rate movements are eliminated by subtracting the
percentage change in the exchange rate from the left hand
side of the equation. (This has to be done because such
variation changes do not affect domestic money stock or the
excess demand for money)
.
Euqation (4) is a dynamic version of models in the
tradition of the monetary approach to the balance of payments
and, following that literature, it does not distinguish
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between the current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments. It makes no prediction as to whether domestic
residents rid themselves of excess money balances by in-
creasing expenditure (i.e. absorption) relative to output, or
by purchasing financial assets abroad.
The second term, which says that the balance of pay-
ments will deteriorate when domestic prices rise relative to
foreign prices, does not reflect current account factors
alone, since such a decline in the country's competitive
position may induce domestic asset holders to export capital
on the expectation that the probability of a future devaluation
of the (fixed) exchange rate has increased. [Ref. 41] Thus,
the present treatment of the overall balance of payments in a
single equation is consistent with our neglect of domestic
financial markets.
Most empirical applications of the monetary approach
to the balance of payments assume that the change in a
country's international reserves is exactly equal to the
difference between the flow demand for money and the flow
supply of domestically created money. This standard
assumption does not seem very realistic in the context of
Jamaica, where the degree of international mobility of goods
and assets may not be sufficient to allow an excess supply of
money to be offset fully and instantaneously by balance of
payments leakages.
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The equation that is specified here for international
reserves is consistent with the broad framework of the
monetary approach, but it includes a degree of dynamic
adjustment as measured by the parameter a
fi
. Thus, it allows
for inertia in the response of reserve flows to monetary
disequilibrium in the short run, while still retaining the
feature that the effect of an expansion in domestic credit
on the money stock is completely offset in the long run.
Substituting for the nominal demand for money gives:








INFCE + CPI-MI] -
a 7 [CPIL-EXAEL-USCPIL-b ] +7 L o J
GExAE
3 . Government Sector
Fiscal policy and the government's budgetary position
are modeled explicitly because of the crucial role that they
play in the money supply process in Jamaica and in overall
economic activity in the country. It is hypothesized that in
most cases excess demand in the economy can be traced back to
deficits of the public sector. Clearly, this assumption
underlies the IMF's requirement in the late 1970s to reduce
the fiscal deficit and limit credit from the Bank of Jamaica
to the public sector. The causes of these effects and their
impact on the economy are therefore important questions that
need to be handled in any analysis where one must make
recommendations about desirable changes in domestic credit
pol icy.
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The model of the government sector that we utilize
assumes that nominal government expenditure adjust propor-
tionally to the difference between the authorities' target
spending and the actual level of expenditure in the previous
period. [Ref. 42]





GE and GE* are the actual and derived levels
of nominal government expenditures, respectively
and a
R
is the coefficient of adjustment.
The derived level of government expenditure is simply
related to the level of nominal income.





Until 1972 it was probably reasonable to assume that
in the long run the government wished to increase its ex-
penditure in line with the growth of nominal income, and
therefore one would expect a priori that the income elasticity
of a q would be equal or close to unity. Such a restriction
would normally also be required to ensure that the overall
model has a steady state solution when capacity income and
foreign prices, or the exchange rate are allowed to change
over time. This constraint is not imposed on the model
during estimation, since there is no reason to suppose that
it has held during the sample period, especially in light of
the change in government priorities during the Manley
administration (1972-1980).
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Substituting equation (7) in equation (6) and solving
for the level of government expenditure one obtains:








[GDPNP+CPI] + ( 1_a 8 ) GEL
As with expenditure nominal government revenues (GR)
are assumed to adjust to the difference between planned
revenues (GR*) and actual revenues obtained in the previous
period
.
(9) AGR = a 1Q [GR*-GRL]
Desired nominal revenues are assumed to be a function
of nominal income.
(10) GR* = b
3
+ an [GDPNP + CPI]
Substituting from this equation for GR* in equation
(9) gives:
(11) GR = a 10 b 3 a io a ll [ GDPNP+ CPI] + (l-a 1Q )GRL
4 . Real Income
Reflecting the short term perspective of the stabili-
zation programs, the model focuses on determining the
deviations of actual output from its full capacity level,
rather than on capacity output itself. Since capacity output
is treated as exogenous to the model, such factors as capital
accumulation, population growth and technical progress are
not considered here. However, because this model dis-
tinguished clearly between capacity output and current output,
it would not be difficult to extend it to allow for endogenous
capacity growth if a more detailed analysis of the supply side
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of the economy were desired, for example, in the context of .
the programs after 1980 designed for purposes of structural
adjustment
.
It is assumed that the rate of growth of output in
Jamaica is positively related to: (1) the excess stock of
real money balances, (2) the so-called output gap, represented
here by the difference between normal capacity output and
actual output of the period, and (3) the impact of the trend
in real government expenditure on output.







[GEHEX] + C 2
Where
:
GDPNP = real gross domestic product
MLP = real stock of broad money (NU)
GEHEX = the rate of growth in real government
expenditure 1960-1980.
GDPNP is the normal level of output. This latter variable
is simply proxied by the trend level of real income:
(13) GDPNP* = YHT
Where
YHT = the linear trend in GDPNP
It follows that:
(14) YHTE = GDPNP*-GDPNPL
It is assumed that the sign on the trend in government
expenditures is positive (along Keynesian lines). However,
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it should be noted that the expansion in government expendi-
tures which accompanied the deflationary monetary policies
in the late 1970s did not generate adequate investment while
the structure of revenue of expenditure and of the government
debt which evolved created additional difficulties. The
burden of maintaining economic activity was, largely, on
government expenditure at a time when revenues were constrained.
Brown feels that the overall rate of expansion of
government expenditures was "not in itself the main source of
difficulty particularly since an expansionary fiscal program
was necessary to insulate the domestic economy from the de-
flationary policies addressed to the balance of payments.
Specific difficulties arose from the fact that the financing
of this expenditure increasingly relied on central bank
financing, on extending the scope of indirect taxes and on
external short term loans." [Ref. 43]
This formulation assumes that any disequilibrium in
the money market will result in a temporary expansion of real
income, and/or conversely, any tightening of monetary policy
that results in a fall in real money balances will have out-
put consequences through hoarding effects on the level of real
expenditure. The degree to which this occurs is measured by
the parameter a ~. While there are no strong theoretical
priors on the size of this parameter, conventional wisdom
would probably tend to argue that it would be small. However,
this is clearly an empirical question.
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Substituting for M* and GDPNP* in equation (12)
yields
:
(15) GDPNP = a 12 [-b 1 +M 2 PL-a 4 GDPNP+a 5 INFCE] +
a13 [YHTE] +
a 14 [GEHEX] + C 2
Or in terms of the level of real income:
(16) (l+a 12 a 4 )GDPNP = a 12 [ -b 1 +logM 9 PL+a 5 IWFCE] +
a 13 [YHTE]




The expected rate of inflation follows the formulation
of Harberger and is equal to the current rate of inflation
minus that of the prior year, or:
(17) INFCE = INFC-INFCL
While this formulation is arbitrary and does not fit easily
into the currently popular rational expectations framework,
[Ref. 44] it has the advantage of simplicity, given no other
data series for Jamaica. [Ref. 45]
6 Domestic Credit and Money Supply
Generally speaking in an open economy such as
Jamaica's the domestic component of the money stock- -the
level of domestic credit extended by the banking system- -is
taken to be the basic monetary tool. However, any model for
a developing country must recognize the linkage that exists
between government fiscal operations and the supply of money.
For this reason, domestic credit is assumed to be determined
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endogenously . More specifically, changes in domestic credit
ADC can take place through changes in the banking system's
claims on the government AGG and on the private sector ACP,
that is:
(18) ADC = ACG + ACP, or
(19) ADC = ACG + ACP + ACL
If all changes in claims on the government are a
reflection of the fiscal deficit of the government, then
equation (19) can be written as:
(20) DC + GE - GR + ACP + DCL
In this formulation, any expansion of the fiscal deficit
results in an equivalent increase in the stock of domestic
credit. This simply assumes that the government finances its
deficit by borrowing from the banking system, using its cash
balances held with banks or by borrowing abroad and converting
the proceeds into domestic currency. Only if the government
were able to borrow domestically from the non-bank sector-
say by selling bonds or bills would this identity break down.
It is obvious that here the assumption of the lack of a
sufficiently developed domestic market for securities,
government or otherwise, becomes crucial. Despite Jamaica's
recent progress in the development of these markets, the
scope for such borrowing is fairly limited thereby confirming
the appropriateness of the definition contained in equation
(20).
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The supply of money (M~) - -broadly defined to include
current demand deposits and time savings deposits--is
identically equal to the net stock of international reserves
(in domestic currency terms) and the level of net domestic




For estimation purposes, the identities of domestic credit
and the money supply were estimated using the following
formulation:
(22) DC = a 15 GE-a GR+a 17ACP+a lg DCL






21 [EXAEL+RL] + a 22 DC-a 23 DCL=b 5




a 27 DC-a 28 DCL+b 6
7 . The Current Account
As noted earlier, the past decade proved to be a
period of considerable stress for the Jamaican economy.
Throughout most of the 1970s, a combination of events caused
the international economic environment to become less con-
ducive to stable growth for the country, and in particular
made its balance of payments adjustment much more difficult.
The substantial fluctuations in the world market prices of
primary commodities, the sharp increases in the price of
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energy products, the slowdown of economic activity in the
industrial countries, and the rise in real interest rates
toward the end of the period were all major contributors to
the serious deterioration in the country's current account
position (Table VII). At the same time, domestic developments
in the country played a significant role in exacerbating pay-
ments disequilibrium. In particular, the government's
inflationary demand-management policies - -undoubtedly combined
with a relatively rigid exchange rate and restrictions on
trade and payments- -resulted in domestic demand pressures and
a cumulative loss in international competitiveness that also
gave rise to current account difficulties.
With respect to the terms of trade, what Jamaica
apparently lost from the inflation of oil and non-oil prices
appears to have been gained back from higher bauxite, alumina
and sugar so that the terms of trade generally did not turn
against her over this period (Tables VIII, IX). Estimates
[Ref. 46] are that between 1972 and 1976 the net contribution
to the current account deficit of import and export price









*in Jamaica ( + 730)
*abroad ( + 250)
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Estimates have not been made of the effect of the
volume of imports on current account deficits during the 19 7 2-
76 period, but Bonnick's [Ibid] calculations show that
domestic factors affecting export supply contributed more to
these deficits than did the direct costs of Jamaica's fuel
bill. •
"In other words, problems on the side of export production
and sales appear to have played the key role in widening
the trade deficit in 1975 and 1976, against the background
of continuing import price inflation and a relatively
once-and-
f
or-all increase in oil import prices." [Ref. 47]
More specifically, among the domestic factors
affecting the current account during this period were quanti-
tative import restrictions, the exchange rate system, the
bauxite levy and fiscal and monetary policy, all of which
affected the relative prices of traded and local products
as well as the level of aggregate demand and supply. [Ref. 48]
In the period from 1972 to 1976, the country's com-
mercial policy moved from one of tariffs and convertibility
to exchange controls. Imports had surged in 1972 with the
liberal expansion of domestic credit and an accumulation of
inventories in anticipation of these shifts to quantative
restrictions. Towards the end of 1972, import restrictions
were imposed on a wide range of consumer goods and foreign
exchange allowances for holiday travel were reduced. In
early 1974, further import restrictions were introduced to
cover all imports except those from CARICOM countries.
Thereafter, the total value of imports, and of major
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categories, were subject to ceilings which were adjusted
occasionally depending on the projected payments position.
When the bauxite levy (paid in foreign exchange) was
finalized in May 1974, some freeing of these restrictions was
permitted, especially of raw materials and fuel which were to
be licensed freely within reasonable limits. Between 1973
and 1976 the share of raw materials rose from 41 percent to
56 percent of total imports and the whare of consumer and
capital goods declined accordingly.
The 1975 import ceilings were promptly exceeded and
the volume of imports rose 11 percent above their 1974 level,
partly because of an expanded public works program. By early
1976, the country had run out of net foreign reserves and the
licensing system was tightened in an effort to enforce very
restrictive import targets.
Until 1971, the Jamaican dollar was freely convertible
into foreign currency and pegged to sterling but after 1972
convertibility was restricted and exchange controls were
tightened. In December 1971, Jamaica chose to continue to
peg her currency to the pound sterling rather than to value
with the US dollar, but in the second half of 1972 the new
Manley government allowed the currency to "float" and in
January 1973 the rate was pegged at US$1.10 per Jamaican
dollar. This rate was later maintained when the US dollar
devalued in February 1973. In all, there was a moderate
appreciation of the Jamaican dollar in 1971-72 and this
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value depreciated by 16 percent relative to the US dollar
between mid-1972 and early 1973.
With a rapidly widening payments deficit and de-
clining net foreign reserves, the exchange rate was held
unchanged until April 1977. This policy rate was maintained
to avoid pressures on the cost of living, especially the
domestic prices of imported food items and the exchange rate
was not used to correct disequil ibria in the balance of pay-
ments. With rising labor costs and a fixed exchange rate,
the profitability of export production declined.
It has already been noted above that the government's
expansive fiscal policy during this period also created severe
balance of payments pressures. Based on the above consider-
ations of the likely internal and external factors that have
effected Jamaica's balance of payments, the following equation
was specified [Ref. 49] for estimating the current account:
(25) ACA = a on TOT+a, n GYIC-a T1 RRI-a,,RER-a,,GEHTEy J 29 30 31 32 33
Where
:
.A CA = changes in the current account balance
(Other measures of the balances of payments included
ATA = changes in the trade account;
^CAA = changes in the trade pluse service
accounts
;
ACAB = ACAA + changes in private transfers-
excluding official transfers.)
GYIC = growth of real GNP in the industrial
countries
.
RRI = real foreign interest rate.
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RER
= real effective exchange rate
GEHTE = deviations from the linear trend of
real government expenditures.
Equation (24) can be viewed as an unrestricted reduced form
relationship that is derived from a structural model of the
components of the current account- - imports , exports and net
service payments. The chief advantage of this formulation
is that it allows separate indentif ication of the relative
importance of external factors- -TOT , GYIC and RRI from
domestic factors RER and GEHTE.
8 . Private Investment
Private investment (Tables X, XI) is assumed to be
positively affected by: (1) an accelerator mechanism
(depicted by the change in real GDP (AGDPNP)
, (2) the activity
of the public sector (both directly through "crowding out"
and indirectly through effecting the investment climate), and
(3) inflationary expectations.
Clearly private investment is affected by inflows of
capital. Foreign private capital inflows have always played
a key role in the balance of payments and capital formation
in Jamaica. [Ref. 50] In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
during a major expansion of the bauxite sector, net foreign
capital inflows made up 20-25 percent of all foreign exchange
receipts and contributed up to 30 percent of domestic capital
formation.
After the completion of these major investments in
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was a net capital outflow. One of the major reasons for the
worsening balance of payments in 1975 and 1976 was the
precipitous drop in long term private net capital inflows
from J$139 million in 1974 to J$30.5 million in 1976. This
reduction in private capital inflows was only partly offset
by the growth of official foreign borrowing on the Eurodollar
markets between 1973 and 1976.
It has been argued [Ref. 51] that the decline in
foreign financing in Jamaica after 1975 was mainly the result
of domestic rather than external factors, in so far as the
internal incentives offered to foreign investors were not
sufficiently attractive from 1974 onwards and the social and
political climate was a major disincentive to foreign capital.
In addition to affecting foreign capital flows, the
public sector in Jamaica has had a strong impact on saving
investment decisions, both directly through the choice of
public investment projects and indirectly through the impact
of its taxing, spending and domestic credit policies on
decisions taken by the private sector. It has shown [Ref. 52]
that unless the supply of foreign savings to the domestic
economy is perfectly elastic, private sector capital formation
and the growth of private sector potential output will be
retarded by ceilings that hold real interest rates below
their equilibrium levels, by taxes on savings or increased
public sector deficits. However, the effect of such policies
on the growth of total potential output (including both the
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private and public sectors) depends critically on what the
authorities do with the funds that these policies put at their
disposal. Many types of government policies may be easily
justifiable in global terms, even if they tend to compress
private sector fixed capital formation. For example, it may
be argued that taxing or running deficits to finance public
sector infrastructural investment, education and manpower
training, etc. will yeild external economies that increase
the return on private investment and thus the rate of growth
of total potential output. Even here of course, taxing or
deficit spending policies impose the usual dead-weight loss
on the static efficiency of the saving- investment process.
Here the net impact of the government budget seems to
have been negative in that the government's deficit also
contributed to crowding out of private investment. The
deficit (in real terms) increased from J$41 million (4 percent
of GNP) in 1970 to J$187 million (17 percent of GNP) in 1976.
Nominal central bank credit to the central government in-
creased from J$4 million in 1971 to J$402 million in 1977.
Commercial banks lending to the government increased rapidly
as well, from J$44 million (11 percent of bank assets) in
1970 to J$248 million (33 percent of bank assets) in 1977.
"Apart from causing inflation, this massive expansion of
government debt displaced private sector debt, including
that, of productive enterprises. Government debt as a
percentage of total debt rose from 11 percent in 1970 to
50 percent in 1977. Furthermore, the average ratio of
taxes to GNP increased from 0.17 in 1970 to 0.28 in 1977.
Through its credit and fiscal operations the Jamaican
government succeeded in bidding away real resources on
an increasing scale." [Ref. 53]
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The share of government in total consumption expenditures
rose from 17 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 1977. No data
is available on its share in total imports. However, the
exemption of government transactions from the stringent import
restrictions implies that government's share became larger.
"In effect the government facilitated its own requirements
by crowding out the import demands of the private sector."
[Ibid]
Unfortunately, during this period public sector ex-
penditures appear to have on the balance negatively affected
private investment. There were two main difficulties. One
was the lack of an appropriate functional distinction between
public ownership as an objective of democratic socialist
purpose and public ownership as a means of redistribution.
"While the political directorate clearly understood the
need to complement the new perception of the political
framework by altering the economic power structure, the
means to change were missing. As the decision-making
process did not cohere, and as this was reinforced by
political fragmentation, the practice of democratic
socialism was more and more conducted within short run
constraints oriented to short run objectives. Unfortu-
nately, the need to emphasize appropriate investment
policies was paramount, not only because of the attempt
to change the political and economic direction. A focus
on investment was particularly necessary at that time
because this was the only means through which short run
deflationary policies, such as were then in existence to
protect the balance of payments can be made to complement
or at least not retard long run growth prospects." [Ref. 54]
The second negative factor associated with government
expenditures was that these expenditures did not extend pro-
ductive capacity nor did they induce private sector activity.
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Further, given the economic conditions of the period, the
government budget in spite of continuous increases was simply
not adequate for the traditional task of filling the gap left
by private economic activity. The point is of some relevance
for an appraisal of the period after 1976, when business
economic activity declined even further. "Given the basic
structural characteristics of the economy, the traditional
budget structure whatever the increases, could not generate
growth dynamic." [Ibid]
The impacts of government action on private investment
are difficult to quantify. There was no significant relation-
ship found between government investment and private investment.
Consequently, the level of government consumption (GCNP) was
assumed to serve as a proxy for the total impact of govern-
ment activity in private sector investment. Inflationary
expectations for inventory and other anticipatory speculative
gains were assumed to be proxied by the change in world
market prices from the previous year to that of the prior
period [Ref . 55] ( CPIWL)
.
In summary, private investment was specified as:
(26) IPP = a 34AGDPNP-a 35GCNP+a 36ACPIWL
9 . Private Consumption
Income redistribution and short term employment
objectives rather than production objectives appear to have
dominated government expenditure and saving (Tables XII, XIII)
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the Special Employment Program introduced in 1972 as a
temporary form of unemployment relief, grew throughout the
1970s. "The trends in government consumption and the social
welfare nature of many of the public programs indicate that
the main effect of governmental growth was the substitution
of public consumption and less productive public expenditures
for more productive private expenditures. Bureaucratic
growth through its resource allocative effect, further deter-
mined the productive capacity and performance of the economy."
[Ref. 56]
In addition to the usual levels of real incomes
(GDPNP) , real private consumption (PCNP) is therefore specified
as positively related to government consumption (GCNP) and
negatively related to declines in wealth caused by domestic
inflation CPI; or
(27) PCNP = a 37 GDPNP+a 3g GCNP-a 3g ACPI
10. Government Consumption and Investment
For purposes of model simulation real government ex-
penditures (GEHEX) are taken as exogenous. Since the compo-
sition of public expenditures appears to be important in
affecting both private consumption and investment, government
expenditures are disaggregated and simply related to the
trend in real government expenditures:
(28) GCNP = a 4QGEHEX
Where
:
GCNP = Government consumption
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(29) IGP = a41GEHEX
Where
:
IGP = Government investment
F. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The model described in the previous sections was estimated
using two stage least squares estimation technique. [Ref. 57]
Several dummy variables were included to take into account
structural shifts cause by the oil price increases in the
early 1970s, and for changes in political regimes during this
period. For the oil price changes, DUMO = 0, 1953-1973; 1,
1974-1982. A delayed reaction to the oil price increases is
given by DUMOA = 0, 1953-1974; 1, 1975-1982. (Dummies with
the 1978-79 oil price increases were tried, but were not
significant.) For political change, DUMP = 0, 1953-1963
(year of pre- independence) ; 1, 1962-1972 (JLP administration;
2, 1973-1980 (Manley PNP administration); and 3, 1981-1982
(Seaga, JLP administration).
As theoretically expected the results [Ref. 58] (Table
XIV) indicate that an excess supply of real money balances
results in an increase in the rate of inflation. The monetary
theory to the balance of payments appears to explain quite
well changes in reserves (AR)
.
Not surprising is the strong negative impact of the trend
in real government expenditures (GEHEX) on real income (DPNP)
.
On the other hand, major determinants of real income are:
(1) the difference between capacity, real income and the
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The current account balance appears to be affected by
both internal (GEHTE) factors and external developments
(GYICL) and (DUMOA) . Interestingly, there was a shift over
time in the relative importance of internal and external
factors with the lagged rate of growth in GNP in the in-
dustrial countries (GYICL) being the only significant variable
for the 1960-81 period (Table XV). For the sub-period 1969-
1981 (Table XVI) government expenditures and the oil price
increases also contributed to the deterioration in the current
account (but probably not the rise in real foreign interest
rates--RRI). As anticipated, government consumption had a
negative impact on private investment, but contributed to
increases in real personal consumption expenditures during
this period.
G. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The estimated model of the previous sections is now used
to illustrate some policy issues that arise in connection
with the implementation of stabilization programs in Jamaica
during the late 1970s. For this purpose, it is assumed that
the estimated model can be taken to reflect the dynamic
behavior of the country. The intent is to investigate the
optimal path that might be followed by major economic aggre-
gates, given alternative values for key exogenous variables.
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The literature [Ref. 59] on optimal control is highly
technical, yet the control itself is straightforward. The
essential idea of optimal control is precisely to derive the
optimal policy in order to steer the economy to the specified
targets. A necessary step in applying control theory is to
specify an objective function or a welfare loss function by
which the outcome associated with the optimal policy or its
alternatives can be evaluated. Given the welfare loss
function and a dynamic model, a policy sequence can be found
minimizing the expectation of the welfare loss for a given
time horizon. In the present case where the welfare loss
function is quadratic and the dynamic system is linear, the
solution takes the forms of a linear feedback control
equation. That is to say, the optimal policy is a linear
function of lagged endogenous variables on the exogenous
factors including the target value of the target variables.
Once the objective function is determined the programming
model together with the objective functions can be used to
derive the optimal policy. [Ref. 60] The optimal policy so
derived does not require any further consistency check as
required in the conventional programming exercises which
usually do not make use of well-defined objective function
and a simultaneous equation model.
While it is recognized that there are many particularly
political elements which are not included in the calculations
but which are nevertheless imperative in making a policy
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decision, policies derived within the framework of optimal
control have the merit of logical consistency and compatibility










where Y. indicates the target values of Yj K is a diagonal
t to t y to
matrix of rank q with q indicating the number of targets and
n is the specified time horizon. The elements in the K
matrix indicate the weights of penalty which are attached to
the squared deviations between the actual values and the
target values of the target variables. The deterministic
optimal control problem for Mexico is therefore to find X
y
which minimized the welfare loss functions given the macro-
economic relationships depicting the country's main economic
linkages
.
It should be noted that in the exercises described below,
there was equality between the number of targets and the
number of control variables so that the optimal policy
solution was unique, not depending on K matrix (given the
targets selected were compatible for the given set of control
variables and that the control variables were independently
and indefinitely variable)
.
Two unresolved issues concern how the success of the
proposed stabilization program as a whole is to be measured
and the appropriate mix of demand and supply policies. The
overall criterion for evaluating a stabilization program is
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much less straightforward than it may at first appear. Even
if a single valued index were available for judging the
success of the stabilization programs in Jamaica, the issue
of the appropriate criterion would still arise; namely, does
"success" mean that the change in the index is positive, zero,
or a smaller negative number than it was before the imple-
mentation of the program?
In practice, of course, no generally accepted "stabili-
zation index" exists. But there are also problems in the
methods of evaluation. One approach might be to review the
outcome of the stabilization programs initiated during this
time. Basically, the main problem with this approach is that
it is essentially subjective. Since there is no explicit
method of ascertaining what would have happened to the economy
in the absence of the IMF stabilization programs, there is no
certain way of distinguishing between changes that were the
result of the program and those that would have occurred in
any case.
An alternative approach would be to perform controlled
experiments in which the effects of various policy instruments
are analyzed in the context of the macro-economic model
developed above. This approach has the advantage that it is
easier to determine the relative effectiveness of alternative
combinations of policy instruments in influencing particular
targets. In this section, we have opted for the second
approach. Specifically, we make use of the structural model
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developed above to analyse the effectiveness of various types
of policies in the Jamaican context.
In examining the model, it is clear that a package of
stabilization measures can obviously reduce excess demand in
the economy either by a policy of squeezing domestic demand
or augmenting domestic supply. Prudence and common sense
suggest that the best stabilization strategy for Jamaica
during this time would have been one that made use of an
integrated package that sought to maximize the benefits or
minimize the costs of adjustment. This section uses simple
simulation experiments to provide a preliminary analysis of
the effects of various adjustment measures.
Specifically, we consider the effects of restraint on
real government expenditures, exchange rate devaluation and
an unspecified supply side policy that succeeds in raising
the level of productive capacity.
For the purposes of the optimal control analysis of the
IMF stabilization period in Jamaica, the model's exogenous
variables were set at their actual historical values. In the
first set of runs, real government expenditures were used as
the design variable intended to control aggregate demand
during the period 1977-1980.
In run I (Table XVII) real government expenditures were
held at their 1976 level, with historical movements in the
exchange rate incorporated into the calculations. The level
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values for the 77-80 period. In contrast to the actual
developments during the period, the results are striking:
1. Real income declines by only 2.2 percent per annum,
compared with the actual decline of 8.2 percent per
annum.
2. Private consumption declines by 5.6 percent per
annum, as contrasted with an actual decline of 9.7
percent per annum.
3. Perhaps most importantly, private investment stabilizes
and actually increases by 2.1 percent per annum, com-
pared with the historical 1976-80 decline of 22.4
percent per annum.
4. Total foreign reserves increase nearly as well as
under the IMF programs, reaching 160.4 compared with
the actual level of 187.0 for 1980.
5. There is also a decline in inflation to 19.8 percent
average increase in the consumer price index, compared
with the historical increase of 25.3.
6. Finally, the current account averages a positive gain
over this period of 3.8 million U.S. dollars, compared
with the average historical decline of 27.1 million
U.S. dollars.
To determine the level of reduction in government expen-
ditures necessary to stabilize real income at its 1976 level,
runs II and III were performed. In run II, real government
expenditures declined by one percent per annum during this
period while in run II the decline was set at 1.5 percent.
The results indicate that a decline in real government
expenditures somewhere between one and one and a half percent
would have been consistent with a stable level of real gross
domestic product.
While it might be argued that a more equitable goal would
have been to stabilize or increase real consumption expenditures,
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the model indicates that growth (measured by real gross
domestic product) and equity (as measured by real personal
consumption expenditures) were not in conflict. In fact,
maximizing real personal consumption expenditures in 1980
instead of real gross national product yielded the same
growth in government expenditures. Interestingly enough,
while the personal consumption equation has a positive sign
for real government expenditures, it turns out that personal
consumption is more strongly influenced by increases in real
gross domestic product and the negative impact of inflation
than it is by government consumption. If in fact government
consumption expenditures were undertaken for equity purposes
during this period, the evidence in runs I through II
indicates that these programs actually had perverse results.
In the context of demand management through controlling
government expenditures, exchange rate policy was also
examined. Run IA simulates the economy under conditions in
run I, but with no devaluation (the 1976 exchange rate held
throughout the 1976-1980 period), while run IB assumes a
once-and-
f
or-all dramatic devaluation of 100 percent in 1977.
The main results of exchange rate oriented policies indicate
that:
1. No devaluation appears beneficial to real income
growth and private investment, but results in a
serious loss in foreign exchange reserves.
2. The one hundred percent devaluation, while contributing
significantly to the country's reserve position, appears
to significantly impair the growth in real income.
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In general, the simulations indicate the purely demand
related stabilization program (incorporating exchange rate
adjustments) placed a high cost on the domestic economy.
While there is evidence that the level of income could have
at least been stabilized during this period through government
expenditure restraint, it is unlikely that any set of
realistically structured stabilization programs concentrating
exclusively on demand management would have permitted a
positive rate of increase in income or living standards.
Jamaica's prime minister during this period, Michael Manley,
was particularly critical of the Fund's approach to stabili-
zation. On a general level, Manley's position was that:
In the average Third World country, the problem is not
the search for markets for, say, a sophisticated wheat
farmer already capable of high levels of productivity.
The problem is how to get a simple peasant hillside
farmer to become an efficient producer in the first
place; how to find the capital with which to help him
terrace his hillside; how to find the money for the
extension of services to ensure that he is trained in
the use of fertilizer and followed up, at first to
ensure that he applies the right one at the right time
in the right amount .... The problems therefore, are
structural and fundamental. The right demand climate
can provide the framework within which production in-
creases but cannot as it is assumed to do in a developed
country, create the increased productive capacity. [Ref. 61]
With regard to the IMF type demand management, Manley's
position was that:
For developing economies, this kind of short-term sharp
demand management approach is inappropriate. What is
needed is that the whole analysis should begin at a
different point. The fact of the foreign exchange
shortage is not the correct point of departure. That is
to be found much earlier in the process by examining the
structural deficiencies of the particular economy. The
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approach should therefore begin with a plan for the
development of a necessary productive capacity. There
should be not attempt to impose upon the client economy
a particular type of economic model. If the country
wished to pursue a capitalist path— well and good. If
they wish to pursue a socialist path— well and good. If
there's a mixed economy option— so be it. Whichever the
model, the search must be for the development of a pro-
ductive capability that exploits the natural advantages
of the society and aims for the most rapid development
of its production for home needs and trade. Clearly this
contemplates development planning of seven to ten years'
duration at least. [Ibid]
And with regard to foreign exchange, Manley's position was
that:
Particular attention must be given to the foreign exchange
that is needed early up front: an economy cannot recover
under a plan which begins to stumble and gasp for air at
the very first hurdle because there is not enough oxygen
for the system at the start .... Great care has to be taken
with demand management itself, lest the social shocks to
which the population in the ailing economy is subject are
greater than it can bear.... We never questioned the IMF
insistence on strict financial controls. We tried to
apply these ourselves and were glad of their assistance
in devising better methods. The quarrels were about
strategies, time spans, capacity to endure, levels of
shock, maintenance of foreign exchange flows, relative
roles for private and public sectors, and the like. [Ibid]
The Manley government which came to power in 1972 did in
fact inherit an economy which had experienced rapid growth,
but which suffered from some serious structural deficits.
They included:
1. a policy bias against the agricultural sector, the
traditional source of Jamaica's employment
opportunities
;
2. an industrial sector which had grown under excessive
protection and had become inefficient, highly import
dependent and capital intensive;
3. increased pressure on urban centers due to migration
from rural areas; and
4. a widening income inequality.
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The development strategy of the Manley government in terms
of economic diversification, an expanded public sector role,
employment promotion and redistribution of income, created an
atmosphere of uncertainty with the immediate result of
reduced investment activity by the private sector. As we
have noted above, the situation was further aggravated by
the increase in petroleum and other commodity prices, the
world recession of 1974-75, the drying up of foreign commercial
bank lending and labor problems in some of the key sectors.
The pertinent question is whether there is any middle
ground between the Fund's short run demand management policy
mix and Manley' s more structurally oriented longer run
adjustment approach.
In this regard, the Manley administration was heavily
influenced by the vision of what has been called the
"structuralist school" in development economics. [Ref. 62]
This vision underplays the role of markets and prices as
tools of resource allocation for economic development. It
assumes a benevolent government machinery that can in
principle ascertain the optimum allocation of resources for
"maximizing the national welfare," and has instruments to
achieve such an allocation. In determining the optimum
allocation, this view emphasized sectoral balances and self-
sufficiency in production rather than prices and costs; for
achieving the optimum it preferred to manage quantities
rather than prices, implying either that the latter are not
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adequately effective tools of allocation or that they had
perverse welfare implications. According to this view, the
distortions that occurred in prices while quantities were
manipulated were therefore either innocuous or necessary
for achieving social objectives.
This particular approach to development has been seriously
questioned in a recent major study. [Ref. 63] In this study,
Agarwala defined price distortions to exist when the prices
of goods and services, as well as capital and labor departed
from "equilibrium" prices. Since in practice these are dif-
ficult to define, some approximations were used by Agarwala.
For example, as a measure of distortions in the pricing of
foreign exchange, changes in real effective exchange rates
from a base period were used, together with the "effective
protection" or taxation of traded goods. Similar distortions
in interest rates were judged by how far they had been
negative in real terms rather than by deviation from market
clearing prices.
Based on this approach, Agarwala classified countries into
three broad categories of distortion- -high, medium and low
and an attempt was made to obtain average indicators for the
decade (1970s) of growth performance as well as for price
distortions. Based on this classification, Jamaica (Table
XVIII) was placed in the high overall distortion group with
medium distortions judged in Jamaica's exchange rate, in the
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and labor markets (together with inflation), and a low dis-
tortion in the protection or taxation of agriculture
(Figure 1) .
Agarwala found that the relationship between price
distortions and growth seemed to operate through both re-
source mobilization and the efficiency of resource use. The
average savings rate and returns on investment in the high
distortion countries (Jamaica was classified in this group)
were lower than average, and these two effects added up to 2
percentage points of their GDP growth.
When growth and price distortions were cross-classified
by rate of growth and degree of distortion, it is interesting
to note that none of the countries with low distortion had a
low GDP growth rate; in fact, none had growth rates below 5.5
percent a year. Neither the lack of natural resources (for
example, in Korea), nor the early stage of development (for
example, in Malawi), nor the socialist system (for example,
in Yugoslavia) seemed to be insuperable barriers to policies
of right prices (low distortions) and high growth. With one
exception, which had obvious special characteristics (namely,
Nigeria) , none of the countries with high growth rates had
high distortions; 60 percent of them had low distortions.
At the opposite end is the experience of the low growth
countries: none of them had low distortions, while 80 per-
cent had high distortions. Here, again, neither the
availability of resources (for example in Peru or Chile)
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nor the stage of development (for example in Argentina) was
adequate to prevent low growth when price distortions were
high.
A sample regression of growth rates on Agarwala's dis-
tortion index showed the latter to have been a statistically
highly significant variable for explaining growth in the 31
countries considered although it accounted for only 34 percent
of the variance of growth. Countries that had significantly
negative deviation from regression estimates were: Ethiopia,
Jamaica, Ghana and India. "For the first three, political
factors probably played a key role; for India, bureaucratic
rigidities relating to licensing and the control system
probably accentuated the losses resulting from the distortions
in the pricing system."
While price distorting policies were justified in Jamaica
on the basis of their income distributional impact (low
interest rates, high wages, low infrastructure prices, and
import restricitons designed to help the low income groups)
,
Agarwala's analysis for 27 countries for which figures were
available on income distribution show that the distortion
index explained barely 3 percent of the variation in equity
(when the latter was measured by the proportion of income
going to the poorest 40 percent of the population) .
In short, cross section analysis of developing countries
in the 1970s confirms the view that price distortions hurt
growth, particularly when the distortions assumed high
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proportions. Countries with low distortions were found to
have relatively high growth. There is no evidence that price
distortions helped equity. In fact, they may have hurt
equity, in addition to creating serious administrative
problems and corruption.
It appears therefore that there was ample scope for
supply side measures in Jamaica during the 1970s. As implied
by Agarwala's work, these supply-side policies must be speci-
fically directed towards the removal of distortions and other
structural impediments to rapid economic growth. To the
extent that such supply oriented adjustment measures could
succeed in their objective of increasing the capacity level
of output in Jamaica, the macroeconomic model developed above
indicates that they will have effect on other major variables
in the economy, including monetary variables and the balance
of payments.
The simulation of the supply side policy traces these
effects. Given the microeconomic character of most supply
side policies outlined above, no attempt is made here to
specify the precise nature of the measures that could produce
this result. Instead, the purpose of this simulation is to
determine the effects of a given increase in the level of
capacity output, assuming it can be achieved, on other
variables that are important targets in the stabilization
program.
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The supply side optimal control programs (Table XIX) were
structured to be comparable with the demand oriented simu-
lations summarized earlier. In runs IA through IID, it is
assumed that initiation of the price distortion measures
during the 1977-80 period were capable of increasing the
level of productive capacity by 5 percent per annum-
-
(YHTE)
in the gross domestic product equation.
In run IA (Table XIX) with capacity output increasing at
5 percent over its level in the 1977-80 period and government
real expenditures held at their 1976 levels, the following
occurred
:
1. Real gross domestic product is able to expand by 2 to
3 percent per annum and private investment by 2 to 7
percent per annum.
2. There is a dramatic improvement in the current account,
however, the overall reserves position of the country
deteriorates somewhat compared with the purely demand
management program (run I in Table XIX)
Increases in the average annual rate of real government
expenditures above 2 percent per annum would result in a
decline in real income, albeit some gain in total foreign
reserves. As might be expected, dramatic increases in
capacity output (10 percent per annum) between 1977 and 1980
produce corresponding gains in real output and enable personal
consumption to stabilize at slightly above its 1976 level
(run HE) .
H . SUMMARY
To summarize, the optimal control simulations suggest
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devaluation, and supply management- -are "effective" in the
sense that they have non-negligible effects on the macro-
economic quantities that are the major target variables of
the Jamaican stabilization programs. While this conclusion
may seem self-evident to some, it needs to be reiterated
because some well-known historical studies of stabilization
programs [Ibid] have concluded that orthodox demand management
policies were ineffective in achieving these objectives, while
others have denied that supply-oriented policies can play any
significant role in economic stabilization programs.
More importantly, this analysis shows that although the
three policies have somewhat similar impact on the overall
balance of payments and international reserves, both the
direction and the time pattern of their effects on other
important variables- -particularly prices, output and con-
sumption- -are quite different. This suggests that, in
principle, it would have been possible to find a combination
of policy measures that would have allowed a stabilization
program in Jamaica during this period to achieve its major
objectives at a smaller cost, in terms of undesired changes
in other important economic quantities, than the program
actually undertaken.
Finally, the simulation results clearly show that suc-
cessful supply-side policies could have mitigated the adverse
income effects of stabilization via demand restraint, but
given the current state of the art, the difficult practical
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question of exactly how supply management policies could have
been implemented and how long they might have taken to achieve
their effect remains unresolved.
I. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the widespread interest in the balance of pay-
ments problem faced by Jamaica during the 1970s and its policy
implications, the paucity of empirical work on this subject
is quite surprising. To this point the thesis has attempted
to further this discussion by examining the direct quantitative
relationship between variations in the current account
position and a set of factors that were assumed to be its
main determinants.
The empirical tests here support the hypothesis that
external factors (as represented by the slowdown of economic
growth in industrial countries but not by the decline in
terms of trade) were relevant in explaining the deterioration
of the various measures of the balance of payments. Domestic
factors (as captured by the increase in real government
expenditures trend) were also relevant in explaining the
deterioration of the current account.
Thus, the empirical results suggest the importance of
exercising circumspection in attributing to any single cause
the current account imbalance experienced by the country in
the 1970s.
It has sometimes been asserted that the nature of a
balance of payments stabilization program depends on the
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origin, or proximate cause, of disequilibrium. This view
asserts that if a payments deficit is the result of ex-
cessively expansionary demand management policies; the
appropriate cure involves domestic demand restraint, whereas
if the problem is caused by exogenous factors such as a
decline in the income growth of the country's major trading
partners, no adjustment is necessary and foreign financing
should be provided.
Since the results here indicated that both types of
factors were at work during the 1970s, and as it is extremely
difficult to separate the relative contributions of domestic
and external factors to current account instability, it would
seem to have made more practical sense to adopt an alternative
view than that adopted by the IMF. In this context the
question of whether a deficit ought principally to involve
adjustment or financing should depend on whether the imbalance
is viewed as domestic or external. If developments that give
rise to balance of payments difficulties are of an external
origin and are expected to be short lived and self -reversing
,
they may involve the need for temporary financing; permanent
changes on the other hand involving a domestic management
necessitate adjustments of the basic supply/demand balance
of the economy.
While one can argue that the slowdown of growth in
industrial countries and the sharp rise in foreign real
interest rates have been a transitory phenomena and were
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likely to be reversed in the near future, the shock caused
by the increase in OPEC prices appears to have been more in
the nature of a long term change. Some financing of the
deficits created by the increased oil import bill occurred,
but the situation also called for a substantial adjustment
effort. In terms of the frame of this chapter, evidence of
insufficient adjustment in Jamaica has been seen in the rapid
increase in government expenditure during the 1970s above
their historical trend. Suitable adjustment would have meant
pursuing a more flexible exchange rate policy, supplemented
by the application of a broad range of supply management
policies. Clearly the continued deficits into the 1980s
indicated that the country not only suffered from adverse
international developments but also from domestic developments
during the 1970s.
The empirical work summarized above also supports some of
the conclusions other writers have noted about the attempts
to cure instability during this period: [Ibid]
1. While the Jamaican authorities had allowed the economy
to deteriorate drastically before going to the Fund,
the conditions required for this agreement were all
out of proportion to the resources the Fund made
available. Even if the agreement was seen by the Fund
as a test of the government's determination to im-
plement tough stabilization measures, the size and
conditional ity of Fund resources provided little scope
and encouragement for the government to adhere to this
goal.
2. Whether or not factors outside the control of the
authorities had been the main cause of Jamaica's
stabilization problems, substantial foreign assistance
was required to support a viable stabilization program
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and reduce the social and economic costs of adjustment
to a level that was not impractical. Although sub-
sequent agreements display an increasing awareness of
the need for economic and politically feasible adjustment
costs, and longer periods of adjustment, insufficient
attention was paid to these matters in 1977.
3. In the case of Jamaica, Fund agreements after 1977 could
not quickly dispel the uncertainty surrounding the
domestic policies of the PNP which earlier had been the
main cause of the decline in real GNP and international
reserves. The ambivalent attitude of the authorities
towards the implementation of stabilization measures
persisted through 1977-80 and the inadequate and ir-
regular supply of imports continued to restrain the
recovery of the domestic economy. Hence, Fund stabili-
zation programs proved to be far from sufficient to
revive local and foreign investor confidence and
promote export-led growth.
4. A sharp change in government policies and attention to
stabilization measures was required to arrest the
decline in real incomes and foreign reserves.
The experience of the Jamaican economy adds support to the
claim that there are fundamental laws and constraints for
socialist and other developing countries alike, namely:
A country that raises wages and vastly increases the
government's budget at a time when productivity and
aggregate supply are falling will bet itself into a
first class economic mess. [Ibid]
By 1980, Prime Minister Manley had left Jamaica in a
dismal economic condition. The country was on the verge of
bankruptcy, with high inflation, high unemployment, and
domestic unrest. Consequently, U.S. security interests in
that region were being undermined.
The next chapter will look at the Jamaican situation after
Edward Seaga was elected to office in 1980. His return to
office marked a major reversal in Jamaican politics and was
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widely viewed as vindication of Western ideals. Faced with
an array of inherent and inherited economic problems it
became evident that the United States needed to lend some
assistance if Jamaica as well as the entire Caribbean region
was to become economically viable. In Chapter II, this
thesis explores some of the history for the CBI legislation
and, through economic modelling, forecast alternative
approaches to various policies.
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II. JAMAICA: THE 198 0s
A. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this section is to determine what effect
the CBI is likely to have upon the Jamaican economy and
consequently how U.S. security interests will be served. The
ensuing discussion will also address both the history and
content of the current version of the CBI. Lastly, this
chapter will attempt to predict on the basis of several
macroeconomic models, the expected results of various policy
options
.
The macroeconomic modelling will be presented after
various viewpoints of the current issues regarding the
Jamaican/Caribbean region are discussed. These are the views
of the Reagan administration, opponents of the CBI, and
finally the private sector, with particular emphasis on the
business investors.
It is important to have some definitions clear which will
provide a common understanding. The first definition of
particular importance is that of the Caribbean Basin, which
countries are involved? As set forth by the House of
Representatives, the following countries may be designated
as benificiary countries by the President of the United




























Turks and Caicos Islands
Virgin Islands, British
In addition, the President shall not designate any
country a benificiary under this law if it is a Communist
country or breaks any of the other numerous rules specified
in "H.R. 2769" of the 98th Congress.
At a glance, this list of countries includes many countries
one normally would associate with the Central America isthmus.
However, due to the close proximity of the Caribbean Island
Nations to the Central American countries, the House of
Representatives considered it necessary to include the
Central America isthmus as part of the Caribbean Basin as the
entire region is one geostrategic area.
The final issue to be clarified before presenting the
tri-opposing viewpoints of the CBI, is what exactly is the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, and how does it differ, if at
all from the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act?
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The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a ground breaking
development program which combines trade and tax liberalization
with tailored financial assistance programs to promote a self-
sustaining revitalization of the economies of the 28 nations
of the Caribbean Basin. The measures are designed to catalyze
expansion of local productive capacity, as well as to assist
a key service sector of their economies. The CBI is really
a combination of several different initiatives: a legis-
lative program of trade and tax benefits adopted by Congress
in 1983; an increase in foreign economic assistance and
foreign aid programs; and a multilateral program which co-
ordinates the efforts of several other donar countries in
this hemisphere to assist the region. The entire initiative
has received broad bipartisan support. It was conceived
during the Carter administration and President Reagan embraced
the plan fully and urged its adoption. Democrats and
Republicans in congress worked closely together for its final
passage
.
The Caribbean Basin is presently in the throes of critical
economic and political dislocations. The small and fragile
economies of this region have been seriously affected by
escalating costs of imported oil, declining prices for their
major exports (sugar, coffee, etc.), a shrinking of export
markets due to worldwide recession, and a decline in tourism.
The cumulative GNP of these nations is only 40 billion
dollars annually. Collectively, their balance-of- trade
111
deficit, per capita, is more than three times the size of the
U.S. trade deficit with Japan. To meet the soaring cost of
imports, which are essential to the smooth functioning of
their economies, these nations must now sell far greater
quantities of their traditional export goods than was the
case only seven years ago. In 1977, one barrel of oil cost
a Caribbean nation the equivalent of five pounds of coffee,
or 155 pounds of sugar. [Ibid] For these nations to buy the
same barrel of oil today, they must sell approximately five
times as much coffee or almost twice as much sugar. •
Social unrest, born of the frustrations which come from
rapidly contracting economies, has brought the threat of
violent confrontation between the people and their elected
governments. Even the exercise of democratic choice at the
polls has been insufficient to overcome the sense of despair
that leads individuals and communities toward radical and
self-defeating solutions to domestic problems. As the freely
elected governments of the region have sought to grapply with
the job of managing their public sector, they have been
thwarted time and again by the accelerating downward slide
of their economies.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative offers the beneficiary
nations the prospect of important new investors in the
agricultural and manufacturing sectors of their economies.
By providing the Caribbean special access to the US market
under a concessionary trade agreement, a new dimension will
112
be added to the investment analyst's view of the Caribbean as
a target for new venture capital. New capital will soon
generate new export income in non- traditional as well as
traditional export products. For the Caribbean states, these
export earnings will hopefully provide the wherewithal to
reduce social tensions through improved living conditions for
all members of their societies.
Other important countries in this hemisphere have partici-
pated in new programs to assist the Caribbean Basin. Speci-
fically, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and Columbia have joined
with the United States in a multilateral action program to
restore stability and prosperity to the Caribbean Basin.
Mexico and Venezuela have contributed to this effort through
a "joint oil facility", under which these governments extend
minimum interest loans to the nations of the Basin from funds
stemming from their sales of energy products in the region.
Canada has pursued major increases in its foreign assistance
to the area and important increases in its on-site trade and
investment counselling. Columbia initiated a technical
assistance program in the area and plans to increase its
financial contributions and ultimately to implement con-
cessionary trade policies.
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act was approved
by the Congress in July, 1983 and signed by the President on
August 5, 1983. Earlier Congress had approved supplemental
financial assistance, which was a part of the President's
original proposal.
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The centerpiece of this legislation is a temporary
extension of one-way, duty-free access for the Caribbean
nations. Duty-free treatment is to be extended on all pro-
ducts with the exception of textiles and apparel, footwear,
petroleum, leather apparel, and canned tuna fish. The
granting of duty-free access will be uninterrupted for a
period of 12 years. The program will be a significant
improvement for the Caribbean countries over their current
access either on a most-favored-nation basis or under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) . While approximately
80 percent of Caribbean Basin non-petroleum exports currently
can enter the United States duty-free, many potential Caribbean
Basin exports are denied duty-free treatment. Further, the
legislation provides a security of access not otherwise pro-
vided for under GSP. For example, there will be no annual
review of product coverage.
Duties on textiles and apparel products will not be
reduced to zero under the free trade arrangement. The de-
cision to leave these duties unchanged came in the context of
the renegotiation of the international Multifiber Arrangement
(MFA) which establishes a global trade regime on textile
products. The global textile regime, organized as it is on
the basis of bilateral quantitative limitations, could have
been disrupted if a major importing nation had extended duty-
free treatment for a single regional grouping. However, the
President is committed to providing the Caribbean Basin more
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favorable treatment for their textile and apparel exports.
This can be accomplished while remaining with the parameters
of our current textiles agreement program.
The free trade program also places a ceiling on duty-free
entry of sugar for so long as the United States is protecting
the domestic sugar price through a support program mandated
by Congress.
The Act also provides for a deduction by U.S. taxpayers
of business expenses incurred in connection with attending a
convention in a beneficiary CBI # country. This benefit will
be extended only to those countries which enter into an
agreement with the United States to exchange tax information.
This important tax incentive should help to promote and re-
vitalize the tourist industry throughout the Caribbean and
Central America. Many countries already have a well developed
infrastructure for tourism, while others have enormous
potential as convention sites. In both instances, the
convention deduction should greatly improve the local economies.
B. BACKGROUND
1 . The U.S. Administration's Viewpoint
The Caribbean, an area of small and fragile economies
in the best of times, has been among the hardest hit by
recent international economic developments. It is a region
which is adrift in the world economy and which is nearly
defenseless today against the rapid fluctuations of the
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international economy. As the basin economies have been
battered by the oil price hikes and more recently the fall of
sugar and other commodity prices, internal tensions have
mounted. A setting now exists in which violence and political
radicalism is flourishing.
These days many people forget how poor and under-
developed the Caribbean Basin countries used to be and how
dramatically they developed in the 1960 ' s and 1970 ' s. This
does not mean either that it had completely escaped its under-
development or that it'had achieved acceptable levels of
income for all its people, but simply that it was well on the
way. The economies of the Caribbean are in critical need of
a catalyst that will promote recovery. The United States
today, has become acutely aware of the difficult problems
besetting virtually all the world's economies. It is thought
the CBI articulates in precise terms the urgent purpose to
which this program is directed.
The native people of the Caribbean have been described
as dynamic, hard-working, entrepreneurial, people who when
allowed to work, have shown themselves capable of making
significant efforts to advance themselves. Yet the present
conditions of that region are not conducive to their potential
efforts. On occasion there has been development of light
manufacturing; development of agriculture and agricultural
exports; development of labor-intensive industries for export
out of the area, and the formation of a significant middle
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class. One of the major objectives of the Marxist-Lenninist
guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala is to destroy the
economic potentials of the countries in order to seize power
in the resulting chaos.
The people of the Caribbean are striving in the same
way as are all the people of the Americas to find their place
within the evolving world economy of the 1980' s. But how can
nations such as Jamaica achieve this goal in the face of
economic obstacles which are posing a serious challenge to
nations of many times their size and possessing far greater
economic resources?
The beneficiary nations of the CBI are widely divergent
in cultures, histories, languages, economies, and governments.
But they share some common characteristics: Most are failing
economically; they are increasingly oriented economically,
politically, and socially to the United States, and together
they form our southern border. Too long has the U.S. failed
adequately to comprehend our national interest in this inte-
grated region, and to take full advantage of the mutual
opportunities greater cooperation offers. These interests
are profoundly important and defined by George F. Kennan
.
"The first and most obvious (interest) was that one ought to
protect the physical intactness of our national life from
any external military or political intrusion- - in other words
that one ought to look to the national security- -for only in
the absence of hostile foreign interference could these
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processes, in the usefulness of which we believed, be given
full freedom to operate. Secondly, one could see to it that
insofar as the activities of our citizens in pursuit of their
private interests spilled over beyond our borders and into
the outside world, the best possible arrangements were made
to promote and protect them." And finally, Kennan postulated
that "problems could then be solved not with regard to the
ugly political realities of the moment but strictly on the
basis of general norms of state behavior, laid down and
accepted in advance. All that was needed was the framework,
and this we Americans were eminently equipped to provide....
We saw ourselves moving benevolently, helpfully among the
waiting people of the world.... our virtues no longer just the
virtues of the American frontier but the virtues of the world
at large."
There is a realistic appreciation on the part of the
leadership in the Caribbean Basin countries that the US pro-
gram and other external donors, can only support what the
Caribbean Basin countries do themselves. There is a deter-
mination that the people of the Caribbean Basin must confront
their own problems. They need and want US help. But they
also know that outside help in and of itself will not do the
job. This is the single most important element in a successful
development effort. Therefore both parties have achieved a
solid base for partnership among local and external efforts
which will turn this crisis around. The President's message
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in the CBI program is that it was designed to let the people
of the Caribbean earn their own way. It was developed in
close consultation with more than two dozen nations of the
Caribbean Basin which are the potential beneficiaries. More
than anything else this program gives expression to the ideas
of the people of the region and speaks directly to their
aspirations for the future which they will build for themselves
The importance of the President's message may be as
important as one of a past President. President Monroe, in
December 1823, sent a message to Congress declaring that the
United States would view as a threat to its own security any
attempt by a European political system or sovereignty upon
the republics of the American continents. The core idea of
the Monroe Doctrine is that the new lands of this hemisphere
must remain free from outside intervention in order to pursue
their own destinies in peace, today endure more vitally than
ever. But the nature of the threats, enemies and solutions
have changed markedly in 161 years.
The President's CBI program is designed to help the
Caribbean Basin countries each create a new productive
capacity and take better advantage of existing resources.
The comprehensive package of trade, investment and aid is
aimed both at addressing the critical short-term economic
problems facing the Caribbean countries and at laying a solid
foundation for long-term economic growth and development in
the Caribbean in order to resist communist aggression. The
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Caribbean Basin Initiative is a response to regional economic
problems which must be addressed if the U.S. hopes to live in
a hemisphere free from the suffering that is now so vividly
apparent in the Caribbean. The CBI is an all inclusive pro-
gram that addresses both long-term and short-term problems
and contains the flexibility that is needed to respond to the
development of obstacles of individual countries. It is one
element of a broader regional program that can transfer the
Caribbean Basin from a region of despair and frustration into
a region of peace and freedom. Most important of all, it is
designed to foster self-reliance.
In a region suffering a history of conflict, the
recently emergent nations of the Caribbean Basin offer a
tempting target for Soviet troublemaking . The announcement
in 1983 by the Kremlin that a Soviet aid package was headed
for Grenada, the express purpose of which is to abrogate the
historic Western ties of that island nation, provides a timely
example of a real concern for our borders, our sea lanes,
the Panama Canal, and US security in general.
The United States has great economic ties to the
region. Despite their colonial past, the CBI countries import
more from the United States than any other country. In 1982
this amounted to over $6 billion, double what we imported
from them, excluding petroleum. US direct investment reached
nearly $10 billion in 1981. The US imports over 90 percent
of our industrial requirements of bauxite and alumina from
120
the Caribbean countries, and it relies on them to a signi-
ficant degree for nickel. It seems clear that the region
offers a vast market for American products, if only greater
economic and political stability can be brought about. [Ibid]
Besides economic and security interests, the United
States is bound by an increasing web of social ties with the
Caribbean Basin countries. Some estimate that, excluding
Mexicans, over 250,000 illegal immigrants now enter the United
States yearly from the countries of the Caribbean Sea and
Central America. Their desparate desire to seek political or
economic emancipation in this country is perhaps matched only
in magnitude by the strain on the services of our National
and State governments provide them once they are here. It
should be noted that for the entire region in fiscal year
1982 the United States targeted about $475 million in
developmental aid; the Federal Government and the State of
Florida have spent over twice that on Cuban and Hatian refu-
gees since the Mariel boatlift.
The ability of the United States to exploit these
increasingly strong ties to the Caribbean Basin countries
rests on its own stability. As the nations of Central
America struggle to end armed conflict among themselves and
with Communist guerrillas, the island Caribbean nations
attempt to restructure their economies away from centuries
of dependency on transfers from their former colonial
sovereigns. A historic opportunity presents itself to the
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United States to aid in placing them on firm, permanent path
to growth and stability. The President's Caribbean Basin
Initiative embodies a sound plan to that end.
The CBI comprises trade, aid and investment in an
integrated plan to foster market-oriented growth among the
beneficiary nations. The market opportunities created by the
trade and tax incentives, together with the aid necessary to
restructure debt and build essential infrastructure, consti-
tute an unparalled opportunity for self-help and permanent
improvement
.
The peoples of the Caribbean, however do not want to
leave their homelands to find liberty. They know that given
the opportunity, their indigenous skills, industry, and
entrepreneurial talents provide the basis for creating havens
of peace and prosperity at home. The integrated, market
oriented plan of the President will provide the surroundings
in which their talents will thrive. The U.S. must create
this favorable climate or possibly loose the region to
communism.
The people of the Caribbean are in such bad economic
shape most of them will flirt with any economic support as a
possible alternative that might improve their lot. If you
are a poor person in the Caribbean Basin, one who is rela-
tively uneducated, who has had no opportunity for exposure
to what really is going on outside of your own little country,
you may readily accept economic aid that will end up putting
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you into socialistic bondage. For instance, Cuba receives 9
million dollars a day in aid from the Soviet Union. However,
it does not function appreciably better than most of the
other socialist countries. The average citizen does not have
anymore money than he did before socialism, but he has less
freedom.
This initiative is not and should be a partisan matter
Every administration in the postwar era has understood that
the Caribbean Basin is critical to both our security interests
and our long term economic well-being. What set the CBI apart
from previous attempts to aid the region is that it is de-
signed to let the region help sustain itself, not just through
direct grants of aid but through the economic incentive of
increased trade.
The US national economic and security interests in
the Caribbean can be stated in more hard-nosed terms. Nearly
one-half of the US trade passes through the Caribbean and
two-thirds of our energy imports move through the sea lanes
of the Caribbean Sea.
The US sells the Caribbean Basin around $3 billion
more in goods and services each year than we import from
them. While the US exports more machinery and capital goods
per capita than to any other developing region in the world.
Still, the economic picture in the Caribbean is bleak, and
the situation is not improving, and further deterioration is
possible. There are over six million people living in the
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Caribbean today who. are . surviving on family incomes at or
below the level of minimum subsistence. In 1982, it was so
bad in the Caribbean that there was a net capital disinvestment
in manufacturing.
Caribbean commodity exports continue to fair poorly
in world markets. This has resulted in staggering rates of
unemployment in the rural communities of the Caribbean. The
region's once active agribusiness sector is all but moribund.
These economic problems will not be self correcting once the
developed nations achieve full economic revital izat ion . The
Caribbean needs US help. It is the Administration's view
that the US can afford to give it. The Caribbean Basin
nations have a total population which is about a fifth of
the US. Yet in one week, we are able to produce as much food
as they produce in one year.
In order to revitalize, the Caribbean must improve
its commercial standing as a location for new permanent and
productive investments. What these nations can do on their
own, however, is limited by the favorable tax treatment of
domestic investment expenditures which now is available to
US investors under various tax incentives in the United States,
including domestic investment tax credits.
Therefore, it is proposed to extend the same type of
tax treatment for investments in Caribbean Basin property as
is now available for domestic property. This would neutralize
a US disincentive to investment in the target region, while
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avoiding tax measures that might make investment decisions
too dependent on US fiscal policy.
So in the case of both US trade and tax proposals a
more amenable climate for commercial activity is being
created. It should be remembered, however, that private
sector initiative and market forces will determine ultimately
the success of the joint efforts.
An important note about the concern in some quarters about
the impact of the initiative on employment in the US. On this
point, critics make one fundamental assumption about trade
and economic relationships with which are incorrect. They
believe that what the Caribbean Basin gains will be lost by
the US. Trade is not a zero-sum game. All economic history
proves it. Economic exchange occurs because both parties
have something to gain from the transaction. Consequently,
the increase in prosperity which we are aiming to achieve in
the Caribbean Basin will not come at the expense of the US
economy
.
2 . CBI Opponents
Regarding military and security assistance, the
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) stated in its testimony to
the House of Representative's Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, that the U.S. is heading down a
dangerous path by supplying arms to aggressive regimes in
Latin America. The problems in Latin America do not lend
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themselves to military solutions. The problems of historical
poverty and oppression can be solved through economic and
political reform and social justice. Instead, we are building
bases in Columbia, South America, and in Central America.
Poverty, oppression and underdevelopment in Caribbean and
Latin American countries cannot be eliminated by overthrowing
governments with which we disagree. Rather, the US must work
for reconciliation of differences and grant assistance to
eradicate the problems which have brought about discontent
in the Western Hemisphere. The United States will have to
learn to live with governments in the Caribbean and Latin
American countries unlike our own. We must accept the fact
that countries like those in the Caribbean and Latin America
will sometimes follow paths of development with which we will
not always agree. [Ref. 65]
The US has an unfortunate major stumbling block in
our foreign policy which is racism. For example, the treat-
ment of the Haitian refugees is a prime example of that kind
of racism. Within the CBI there is virtually no mention of
the enormous economic problems that creat this flow of
refugees, and there are no over-all solutions for the problems.
Indeed, the very language of the CBI refers to the problem of
"illegal immigration" as rationale for offering this country
a paltry $5 million dollars. The problem is viewed as a
problem for the United States not a problem for the thousands
of homeless and desperate Haitian refugees.
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The CBI points to the Administration's racism, and
warns that it has been a disease in our own country that has
destroyed many of our own best intentions. It would be a
tragedy to extend this disease into our foreign policy where
black and brown cultures of the Caribbean are ignored or
pushed on the back-burner; where attempts of countries like
Mexico to take leadership in resolving conflicts are treated
condescendingly; and where indigenous revolutions are credited
to the Soviet Union. The US must begin to recognize these
countries in their own right, as legitimate entities within
the world of nations.
The CBI would like to separate the military aid out
of the CBI and make it a purely economic assistance program.
Those countries who want economic aid should be prepared to
forfeit the military aid. This avenue would give a clear
picture of what we intend for those countries and their
people; US military assistance, and what the US feels neces-
sary for other reasons involving the security of our own
country should be separate.
The Reagan administration's CBI leaves much to be
desired. The basic flaw of the administration's approach is
one of misplaced emphasis. The CBI has been conceived,
packaged, and presented mainly as a means to counter Cuba,
not primarily as a way to respond directly to the needs of
the people of the Caribbean. So, while attention is finally
being paid, it is largely the wrong kind.
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Although the CBI should be noted because it combines
and coordinates several development instruments, the proposal
is grievously flawed by its misplaced emphasis on military
security and aboundless faith in the private sector. Moreover,
the CBI suffers from its resemblance to "Dollar Diplomacy" in
the region. In this context, the initiative is bound to be
ineffectual. The blatant thrust of the program is that
friendly and strategically situated countries will be supported
and rewarded regardless of despotic records and that enemies
and alternative regimes will be brutally punished and sub-
verted. The thinly veiled bilateralism allows leverage that
will be used to divide the Basin countries into foe and
friend, oblivious to long-term development priorities. This
thrust will work to force reformist, progressive elements in
the region to cower, thereby retarding political and social
maturation. A more comprising and constructive diplomacy
would better serve the alleged goals of peace and stability;
but American control and economic gain seem to be the goals.
The CBI recommends that legislative drastically amend
the CBI package if taxpayer dollars are to be wisely used and
the US's own best interest served. Specifically, it is
suggested that the program include Cuba and Nicaragua, that
it address the infrastructure needs of the area, that the
investment incentives be tied to progressive levels of
indigenous employment, and that the monies allocated to El
Salvador and the American Institute for Labor development be
reduced and redirected toward the Eastern Caribbean.
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The concept of a Caribbean Basin is, in many ways
artificial. Central America differs from most of the Caribbean
Islands in culture, economic structure, and most importantly,
in political institutions. In the Dominican Republic and
much of the English speaking Caribbean, the CBI has a better
chance of success on the Caribbean Islands and Panama, where
the requisite political stability exists.
In middle Central America, however, the political
status quo has been challenged by powerful insurgencies, and
violence and chaos are tearing at the foundations of society.
At bottom, the administration is more concerned about the
political turmoil and economic decline in Central America than
about the Caribbean Islands. This priority is reflected in
the fact that $234 million of the $350 million of the proposed
emergency supplemental assistance package is earmarked for
Central America.
In Central America, the administration's economic and
political strategies have been working at cross purposes.
The administration's economic plan aims to stimulate business,
but a confrontationist diplomacy threatens to delay the resto-
ration of investor confidence. Rather than seriously pursue
negotiation among all the major parties to the conflict in
El Salvador, the administration has supported a political
process that has excluded important political sectors to
defeat them militarily. The recent elections suggest the
Salvadoran people want peace, but the outcome of the elections
seems likely to increase polarization and violence.
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Rough calculation show the United States will benefit
more than the Caribbean, especially in the area of potential
repatriation of profits from the investment that is likely to
flow into the region, and on the basis these calculations over
this twelve year period, at about the six year point, the
repatriation of profits are likely to offset the annual inflow
of private capital going to the region. So that in fact, the
United States will turn out to be a major beneficiary as far
as sending private capital into the region is concerned. The
C£l is primarily intended to benefit US interests and that its
long term impact on the countries in the region is likely to
be negative. Its main impact would be to enhance American
access to and control over local resources and to increase
their economies' dependence on the United States while
weakening the economic links that presently exist within the
region. Regional mechanisms of cooperation, it was pointed
out, are being sidestepped and undermined.
The intrinsic problem with the CBI, is that it is a
continuation and an even more cynical manifestation of long-
standing American policy toward its neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere. Caribbean and Central America countries were
specifically chosen at this time for special treatment due to
their perceived strategic importance, but the United States,
it is pointed out, always has considered the region as a
resource base. Accordingly, it has encouraged and supported
an excessively free market model of development in the private
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sector. Hence, the initiative is the economic component of
a US effort to maintain and enhance its domination of the
The proposal seeks a strengthening of economic ties
which will assure to raw materials, provide investment
opportunities, and preserve traditional markets for US goods.
With foreign direct investment generally declining, American
taxpayers are being asked to pay for financial incentives to
encourage US based multinationals to seek investment outlets
and production bases from which to export to the United States
Trade dependencies are also being deepened, in response to
threats from trade competitors, in an attempt to redirect
trade away from excolonial powers in the region. In effect,
the United States, is trying to firmly establish a Third
World development model, a model of Caribbean dependency on
the United States.
3 . U.S. Business Investors
During the hearings by various subcommittes of the
House of Representatives on the CBI much testimony was pro-
vided by business that the CBI addresses the basic issues
which exist in the Caribbean region; like unemployment, little
or no opportunity and the resulting political instability.
The economies of the Caribbean countries are fragile at best.
Since these countries are so small and independent, they must
have economic aid to diversify in order to prosper.
Additionally, these countries must have access to American
markets to increase viability.
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Economic growth in jobs and economic stability are
the only things that can create political stability in the
Caribbean region in the long run. Therefore, the CBI's tax
credits and tariff -free provisions address these needs. The
almost landslide victory that Prime Minister Seaga was given
by the Jamaican people in the last election, proves the fact
the people of the Caribbean want to identify with the demo-
cratic institutions of the United States, that they want to
identify with our market economy, but they just do not have
the ability at this point. They need jobs and a viable
economy. The CBI is not a government giveaway, but only a
Caribbean opportunity. In order to take advantage of this
opportunity, the individual nations of the Caribbean Basin
are going to have to work hard themselves they must do so
with US assistance in exploiting the opportunity that the CBI
would give them in finding access to the US markets, and
build up their own local economies that would be afforded in
that manner.
For the CBI to work effectively, it is basic to
guarantee the security of the area. Guerrilla advances in
El Salvador and Guatemala and budding terrorism in Honduras
and Costa Rica have eliminated the possibility of economic
stability and growth in the region, until they are controlled
Right now, businessmen of the American chambers in the area,
are trying to hang on until the situation stabilizes. Until
the present threat of a communist takeover of the area is
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eliminated, none of the medium term incentives of trade and
investment will function effectively. For the CBI to work,
there is a very brief time frame or "window" with which to
be successful. Many of the Caribbean leaders are friendly
to the US, and they must produce positive results in this
"window", or political reversals and political change is
likely to occur.
Nobody can deny that there are problems in El Salvador
and Guatemala. The governments are not perfect democracies.
There are excesses in the military, there is social injustice
and excess concentration of wealth. The solution is not,
however, to throw the baby out with the bath water and bring
in a Sandinista- type government or even anything close, and
this is where the frustration lies.
According t R. Bruce Cuthbertson, Regional Vice-
President for Central America, Association of American Chambers
of Commerce in Latin America, businessmen who supported the
ouster of Somoza in Nicaragua have seen the Sandinistas re-
place him with a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The
Sandinistas negotiate in bad faith. Many businessmen have
been jailed for disagreement in business disputes. Others
have simply and ruthlessly killed. In all this, the hypocrisy
and cynicism of their rhetoric and the coldly calculated
effectiveness of their means, the Sandinistas, as well as
other guerilla groups in Central America, have only one
objective: power. They mean to obtain it and to hold on to
it by whatever means necessary. [Ibid]
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Other members of the Caribbean wonder who is next in
this onslaught of personal freedoms. The answer to this
question will determine if there is development or not,
investment or not, withdrawal or not, and will determine the
success of the CBI and with it the future security of the
United States.
C. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL
There are two courses of action generally considered as
options by which vitality can be restored to the Jamaican
economy. The first method involves stimulation of those
elements of domestic industry which will expand export pro-
duction. This is generally recognized as one of the primary
focuses of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The second and
often proposed alternative, affords Jamaica easier access to
foreign capital and encourages a marked increase in external
debt. Undoubtedly the means by which either of these policies
is implemented could be effectual upon the result. However,
the method by which the basic policy is enacted is beyond
the scope of this model. The model merely postulates pro-
jected values predicated upon a range of economic forecasts.
Endeavoring to determine optimum policy we have proceeded
under the basic assumption that these approaches are so
radically different, that given a range of economic pro-
jections one method could be shown preferential to the other.
The approach has been to segment the economy into separate
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variables as illustrated in Table XX and then observe their
response after a variety of economic occurrences were
introduced.
The assumptions upon which this model is based proceeds
from a series of nine behavioral equations. The intent being
to focus on the broader aspects of the Jamaican economy, while
acknowledging that greater specificity may yield marginally
different results. This model is similar to the one discussed
in chapter one, and depicts an economy that is:
1. Relatively small in comparison to the world;
2. Amiable to international trade and financial flows;
3. Assumes an exchange rate which is pegged or externally
determined, and
4. That there is a rudimentary financial sector. The
implication being that there is a limited capability
to substitute financial assets for monetary holdings,
and that interest rates on those resources are
governmentally controlled.
The equations in the model are subject to random variations
and explain private and government consumption and investment,
as well as imports, exports, domestic debt, the money supply
and finally the consumer price index.
1 . Private Consumption and Investment
The difficulties of accurately incorporating consumer
durables in measuring private consumption are generally ac-
cepted. Consequently our behavioral equation specifies that
Real Private Consumption (PCNP) is positively related to
both Gross Domestic Production (GDPNPL) and Government
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Consumption (GCNP). While, it is negatively associated with
domestic debt (DEBTP) , or more specifically;





















= 0.9, D.W. = 1.82, F = 54.15
Private Investment (IPP) is commonly described as the flow
of expenditures devoted to increasing real growth stock. In
this equation, private investment is enhanced by changes in
real Gross Domestic Product (GDPNPL) and adversely by elements
of domestic debt (DEBTP). Clearly, there are other influences
upon private investment, particularly such things as in-
vestment climate, inflationary expectations, and the inflow
of foreign capital. However, in this equation, private
investment is specified as;









= .066 r 2 = .55




= 358.63 F = 11.64
2 . Government Consumption and Investment
Government consumption (GCNP) is identified as being
positively related to Gross Domestic Product (GDPNPL) and
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Do-lar Dominated Public Debt (DEBTFP) . It has a negative
correlation with Bank of Jamaica's Credit to the Government
(BOJCGPL) . Specifically stated:
(32) GCNP = bgGDPNPL + b
g
DEBTFP + b^BOJCGPL - bn
b
8
= .22 r = .946
b
g
= .2-8 D.W. = 2.35




Although real government expenditures were considered as
exogenous in the model simulation in chapter one, they have
been noted as playing an important part in determining the
equalibrium level of national income. In estimating an
equation to reflect government investment (IGP) it is assumed
a positive correlation with dollar dominated public debt and
Bank of Jamaica credit to the government or;
where;
(33) IGP = b 10 DEBTP + b,,BOJCGP + b-,v J 12 13 14
b„- = .24 r 2 = .55012
b 13
= .058 D.W. = 2.86
b 14
= 51.59 F = 11.64
3 . Import and Exports
The balance of exports over imports is a crucial
aspect of any island economy. In order to stimulate economic
growth, Jamaica needs to provide the world market with suf-
ficient quantities of goods, services, or raw materials to
138
offset those costs incurred from imports. One of the primary
purposes of the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative, is to
stimulate the export sector of these economies, and thereby
favorably alter this balance. In adapting equations to
reflect imports (ZNP) it is assumed that imports are related
to both exports (EP) and government consumption (GCNP)
.




= 1.0 r 2 = .963
b 16
= .23 D.W. =2.71
b
17
= 3.91 F = 351.55
Exports (EP) on the other hand were modeled in the following
manner.





= 1.14 r 2 = .923
b
19
= 1037.95 D.W. = 2.07
F = 107.43
4. Domestic Debt
There is an important correlation, in any developing
country, between the supply of money and that governments
fiscal operations. The supply of money being a finite source
from which both the government and private sectors compete.
This relationship if allowed to develop to too severe an
imbalance could retard future growth. In forecasting growth
potential it is imperative to consider the current status of
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that country's domestic debt. In the behavioral equation,
domestic debt is negatively influenced by exports and positively
affected by both debt and government consumption, that is:
(36) DEBTP = b 2QDEBTPL
- t> 21 EP
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The money supply is generally assumed to mean the
amount of money in an economy. The normal definition is
segmented into three parts Ml, M2 , and M3 . Ml generally
refers to currency plus demand deposit; while M2 is used to
describe Ml plus time and savings deposits at commercial
banks; and M3 is M2 plus deposits at non-bank thrift insti-
tutions. When used in the Model Money Supply (MI) is
positively associated with dollar dominated public debt, Bank
of Jamaica nominal credit to the Government, and Government
consumption. That is:





= .357 r 2 = .981
b 25
= .135 D.W. = 2.26





6 . Consumer Price Index
The consumer price index is an effective measurement
when used in determining relative changes in the prices of
specified consumer goods. On the consumer level, it reflects
the real domestic value of the dollar. In the behavioral
equation it is defined as being determined by both money
supply (MI) and historical (lagged one year) reference to
last years consumer price index (CPIL) . Stated in terms of
the equation:
(38) CPI = b~ CPIL + b onMIL + b_ n
^






.66 r 2 = .993
b
2g
= .0006 D.W. = 2.00
b 3Q
= .01 F = 1932.79
D. RESULTS
In trying to decide upon the optimum policy for Jamaica,
six areas were established for which the results are to be
judged. The criteria established that the best policy would
be one which increased GNP , savings, and exports, while de-
creasing domestic debt, external debt and held the consumer
price index below 10%. This chapter contains eight different
computer simulations, each with four subroutines. These sub-
routines vary the export rate of growth from 2 to 8% in 2%
increments. The first simulation had Bank of Jamaica Credit
to Government increased at 15% per annum while external debt
141
was held constant at the 1982 value, (Table XXI). Only two
options appeared as potentially capable of satisfying the
prescribed criteria, that of achieving either a 6% or and 8%
rate of export growth. A 6% increase in the export growth
rate would be acceptable if it were not for the .2% decrease
in the rate of private consumption. However, at an 81 export
rate of growth the forecast complies with all the established
goals, and maintains a consumer price index (a measure of
inflation) below 10%. This simulation appears to be the
optimal selection and best satisfies the judgement criteria.
The second simulation maintains Bank of Jamaica credit to
the government at 15% per annum, but the external debt has
been increased at the rate of 5% annually (Table XXI). Again,
as rate of export growth increases the macrovariables appear
to be nearly optimal at the 6% rate. Closer observation
reveals an adverse affect, namely inflation ranging from
10.4% to 10.7%. Therefore, this simulation does not fit the
mold as a successful policy option.
The third simulation is with BOJ credit to government
increased to 25% annually with external debt held at the 1982
value (Table XXII). In this scenario, the macrovariables
begin to look promising as low as the 4% rate of export growth
and very healthy at the 6% level. However, inflation values
at the 12.6% level remove this choice as a viable option for
the policy maker.
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The fourth simulation is with BOJ credit to the government
at 25%, but external debt increased at 5% per annum (Table
XXII). Here too, inflation becomes the negating variable,
ranging from 13.9% to 14.1%.
The fifth and sixth simulations are with BOJ credit to
the government at 35% annually (Table XXIII). In both cases
where external debt is held constant at the 1982 value, and
the external debt increased at 5% per annum, inflation was
abhorrently high, ranging from 17.0 to 18.2%. Neither case
can be considered a plausible alternative.
The seventh and eighth simulations were with Government
external debt decreasing at 2.5% per annum (Table XXIV).
Inflation is double digit at all levels of export growth
causing the rejection of these alternatives.
E . SUMMARY
In summation of this macroeconomic modeling, there is one
viable policy option which satisfies all the proposed criteria
This is simulation number one (Table XXI), where all the
macrovariables maintain the desired levels and should serve
to restore Jamaica's economic vitality. Moreover, inflation
is predicted not to exceed 8.9%, while domestic debt will be
decreased by 2% and GNP is increasing at 3.5%. The other
seven computer simulations seem to embody one more adverse
characteristic that removes them from consideration. Since
most alternative policy options were eliminated based upon
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unacceptable inflationary values, significant changes to
these underlying inflationary pressures might necessitate a
reevaluation.
After completing the analysis of these simulations, it
appears the CBI's legislation provides one of the best pos-
sible options for America to pursue in order to aid Jamaica
and hopefully other Caribbean nations. Clearly the approach
adopted by Michael Manley was wrought with difficulties and
was an economic catastrophy for Jamaica. For the future,
many questions remain about the present government and whether
Seaga's approach will provide viable solutions to Jamaica's
economic ills. More specifically, can the people of Jamaica
accommodate a policy which, as this chapter recommends,
attains an export growth rate of 81? The answer to this
question necessarily rests, at least in part, within the
Jamaican culture. That is, do the Jamaicans possess the type
of national character which will sustain the necessary
motivation and drive to achieve this goal, or rather, will
they succumb to circumstance and remain an impoverished
nation. These questions are issues which will be explored




Before addressing specific questions about Jamaican
culture, or any culture for that matter, it is necessary to
develop an appreciation for some of the more significant
influences which contributed in the formation of that par-
ticular culture. History is unquestionably among the important
forces acting upon both cultural development and national
character. For that reason this chapter recapitulates
Jamaican history, with particular emphasis upon those events
which have had a lasting influence. The final portion of the
chapter identifies some distinguishing societal chatacterist ics
which can be identified in the composition of the national
character.
The most important dictates governing economic development
reside within that country's people. That is not to say the
natural resources, plant facilities, capital availability, or
any of the countless factors of production are without sig-
nificant influence, for they are important. It is however,
ultimately a country's people which will in large measure
determine their future economic viability.
Just as parents deliver to their children a unique set
of genetic programming produced with the particular inter-
action of their RNA and DNA genetic contributions, each
country brings to its people a distinct cultural heritage.
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The factors which compose this unique heritage are forged by
peculiarities determined within both their culture and their
history. Since all countries necessatily possess dissimilar
histories, they likewise possess many unusual cultural idio-
syncrasies. This seemingly obvious fact, too often goes
unnoticed when trying to adapt solutions to the economically
distressed countries of the world. The island country of
Jamaica is no exception.
Historically, Jamaica was first a part of the Spanish
empire having been discovered by Columbus on May 5, 1494.
The original inhabitants, Arawak Indians, were virtually
exterminated during the 150 years of Spanish rule. Jamaica's
main role during this era was as a food producing center in
support of Spanish settlements and military bases elsewhere
in the new world. As the other Spanish colonies became more
self sufficient, the importance of Jamaica as an agricultural
center diminished. Spain's control over Jamaica ended in May
of 1655 with the arrival of a British expeditionary force.
Which, after an unsuccessful attack upon the Spanish forces
in Hispaniola, decided upon Jamaica as an alternate target.
The result was successful and by 1660 the last of the occu-
pying Spanish forces were expelled.
Jamaica remained under British rule until they obtained
their independence in 1962. During the early years of
British rule Jamaica was used increasingly as a base from
which pillaging attacks on Cuba and other Spanish territories
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were conducted. This was common practice during the seven-
teenth century, as trade rivalry between the English, Spanish
French and Dutch competed for a larger share of new world
wealth. This competition encouraged buccaneering as each of
the European powers sought to expand both their treasury and
influences. The town of Port Royal in Jamaica became one of
the primary center's from which Buccaneer's carried out raids
upon both Spanish and Dutch possessions. These buccaneering
exploits reached their zenith under the legendary exploits of
the notorious pirate Henry Morgan. His successes earned both
recognition and acclaim for which he received an English
knighthood and was subsequently appointed as Governor of The
Island of Jamaica.
As British influence became more dominant in the region
their policies shifted toward preservation of the status quo.
This change in emphasis caused a realignment of the Jamaican
economy and fostered a renewed growth in the agriculture
sector. The foundation of this newly formed agricultural
economy centered upon large landholding estates. For only
then could the agricultural technology of the day produce
sufficient quantities of foodstuffs to be competitive in the
world market. These methods tended to be highly labor in-
tensive and generally required single crop specialization.
Jamaica was successful and became the largest English, and
for a period of time the largest world producer of sugar.
With the alteration in the economy, new demands for a cheap
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labor source emerged. The solution to this need for cheap
manpower was found with the development of slavery. When the
subjugation and exploitation of the less technically advanced
peoples of the world proved profitable great fortunes were
amassed through slavery. The majority of the slave trade
originated from Africa.
The early population of Jamaica consisted mostly of black
slaves, white male overseers, attorneys and auxiliary personnel
Early estates were often administered by the white overseers
who, likely as not, managed the estate for absentee landlords.
Landowners tended for the most part to reside in England, and
hence the overseerer was given virtual Carte Blanche over the
administration of the estate. The primary concern of the
owner was no doubt centered on the estates profitability.
The result of this type of colonial structure tended to favor
a short run maximization of output with little or no regard
for long term consequences.
In the year 1722 the Jamaican population was comprised of
the following percentages and numbers of people;
WHITES 9% 7,920
FREE COLOREDS <1% 660
BLACKS 89% 78,320
TOTAL POP 86,900




FREE COLOREDS 3% 10,200
BLACKS 881 299,200
TOTAL POP 343,400
The free colored population continued to rise and by the
year 1844 they commanded a full 18% of the Jamaican population
[Ref. 66] This dramatic rise in the ratio of free colored
was caused primarily by some unusual circumstances which pre-
vailed in both Jamaica, and other British colonies in the
West Indies. The estate managers were invariably either
single or if married were living seperately from their family.
Usually the families were left in England while the husband
or father went off to the colonies to fulfill his contract.
The outgrowth of this type of colonial structure gave rise to
practices which often made concubines of the younger prettier
female slaves, and resulted in the rapid growth of the
mulatto population.
The offspring of these relationships tended to enjoy
greater privilege and social standing than their blacker
brothers. These circumstances tended to promote a laddered
social structure among the indigenous blacks. The color and
tone of one's skin determined where or what rung of the social
ladder one belonged (i.e. the lighter the skin the higher ones
social status). These children of mixed blood, were often
treated more preferentially and were more likely to be given
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their freedom. Even today the free colored population of the
West Indies have been described as "an inbred group whose
values are expressed in genteel etiquette and status -giving
possessions." [Ref. 67] The absence of the white female
from the family unit in colonial Jamaica introduced a cultural
influence that survives to this day.
Equally important, but somewhat less tangibly measured,
were the contributions to Jamaican culture which stemmed from
the attitudes and actions on the part of the overseerer. Who,
as a consequence of his separation from his family, tended to
view Jamaica only as a place of employment rather than his
home. The policies and methods of operation for most of the
estates tended to reflect similar values and therefore adopted
similar practices. Most of which emphasized short term pro-
fits with little thought of the associated long term costs.
The majority of Jamaicans shared this cultural heritage since
most of the black populace were tied to the plantation system
and were thus effected.
Although, for the most part blacks who comprised the
slaves of colonial Jamaica and those residing in America
originated from similar tribes and geographic areas in Africa,
they were exposed to two very dissimilar environments. The
African culture was much more predominant among slaves in
the West Indies as it was continually being infused and
refreshed with the African cultures. This served to con-
tinually remind the indigenous cultures of their African
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heritage, and represented a marked difference from the
experiences of those blacks which were destined for America.
The West Indies were often a stopping point for slaves
enroute to America and other locations. Slaves were fre-
quently sent to Caribbean plantations prior to being trans-
ported to America or other world markets. They were kept in
these locales until they developed familiarities with the
western language, culture, and developed sufficient biological
immunities. The staging of slaves in the Caribbean had
profound effects, in both the long and short term.
In the short term, these recent transplants had much
higher mortality rates, since they had not developed immuni-
zation to local diseases. They were also subject to much
harsher treatment since it was more costly to maintain slaves
than to replace them. This factor more than others was mostly
responsible for the higher mortality rates among Caribbean
blacks. The West Indian blacks also had to be much more self-
sufficient, as he couldn't allow for the degree of labor
specialization afforded his kinsman in America. The plan-
tations were required to produce their own foodstuffs since
the economies of the time didn't create the necessary markets
to yield an agricultural base designed to support the local
population. This circumstance was particular to the West
Indies, and from its inception developed a greater sense of
black independence and fostered a certain enterprising spirit
among the early blacks. By contrast the American black was
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completely dependent on the system for his sustenance. This
fact is simply verified by the persistent uprisings which were
so common among the early Caribbean states. The separate
independence offered the Jamaicans of the "COCKPIT COUNTRY"
attests to its presence in Jamaica.
Further analysis of the Jamaican national character as
presented in the remainder of this chapter is based upon the
premises of "basic personality" as developed by Dr. Abram
Kardiner and Dr. Ralph Linton. According to Dr. Linton the
concept of "basic personality" depends upon the following
point
:
1. That the individual's early experiences exert lasting
effect upon his personality, especially upon the
development of this projective systems.
2. That similar experiences will tend to produce similar
personality configurations in the individuals who
are subjected to them.
3. That the techniques which the members of any society
employ in the care and rearing of children are
culturally patterned and will tend to be similar,
although never identical, for various families within
the society.
4. That the culturally patterned techniques for the care
and rearing of children differ from one society to
another
.
If these postulates are correct, and they seem to be supported
by a wealth of historical evidence, it follows:
1. That the members of any given society will have many
elements of early experience in common.
2. That as a result of this they will have many elements
of personality in common.
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3. That since the early experience of individuals differs
from one society to another, the personality norms for
various societies will also differ.
The basic personality type for any society is that per-
sonality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the
society's members as a result of the early experiences
they have in common. [Ref. 68]
Clearly this is not meant to imply that the majority of
the members of any society will behave or respond identically
or even in a similar manner. Individual behavior is deter-
mined by a unique blend of personality traits and remembered
responses to stimuli as presented by the environment. Con-
sequently there is a wide range of expected behavioral and
attitudinal responses from any group or individual within a
particular society. Still it is useful to determine a 'basic
personality type' even though it is recognized that very
different behavior can occur from similar personality types.
Dr. Linton says of the "basic personality type," that it does
not correspond to the total personality but rather the pro-
jective system, or the value attitude systems which are basic
to the individual personality configuration. [Ref. 69]
The basic personality type for any group can be defined
in terms of the value orientations ivhich were previously
shared by a majority of the members of the group. If we
project this supposition further and replace the "group" with
a "society", then what emerges is a basic personality type




The identification of a society's dominant value orien-
tations with a basic personality type is discussed in Dr.
Florence R. Kluckholm' s book Dominant and Variant Value
Orientations . There are two underlying beliefs upon which
her theory rests; the first supposes that there is a "limited
number of basic human problems for which all people at all
times and in all places must find some solution," and the
second assumes, "that the variability in solutions is within
the realm of possibility".
The first premise arrives at five basic problems of key
importance, which Dr. Kluckholm identifies as;
1. What are the innate predispositions of man? (Basic
Human Nature)
2. What is the relation of man to nature?
3. What is the significant time dimension?
4. What is the valued personality type?
5. What is the dominant modality of the relationship of
of man to other men? [Ref. 70]
The second premise just assumes that the solutions to the
problems faced by mankind are solvable. The observations
about commonly faced human problems will serve as a guide in
discussing Jamaican society. The purpose of which will be
to explore those elements of basic personality which compose
the "national character" of Jamaica. By definition this
endeavor will combine an array of personality types which
transcend social, economic, and educational differences.
That is to say, members of very different social sectors,
by virtue of their nationality common value orientations.
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Jamaicans tend to perceive human nature as a mixture of
both good and bad. Most seem to believe that without laws
to govern behavior the darker side of man's nature would
prevail. Impulses to do wrong are resisted mainly because
the individual fears the law, not because he is led to do
right by his conscience or some other standards of conduct.
Curiously, while most Jamaican men are characteristically
belligerent, they also exhibit many feminine traits. This
phenomenon results mostly from an adolescence spent almost
exclusively in the care and company of women. This peculi-
arity owes its origin to early patterns of sexual permissiveness
which endure to this day.
Sexual permissiveness stems primarily from two beginnings,
the first as a holdover from sexual norms practiced during the
early slave days, and the second as a consequence of costs
associated with a legal marriage ceremony. Most families
with parents who have been ceremoniously wed in church are
from the upper and middleclass. This occurs primarily because
the costs associated with this type of ceremony is beyond the
means of most Jamaicans. However, rather than forego an
active sex life until middle age or until financially able,
most Jamaicans prefer to ignore the costlier conventions of
marriage
.
The rarity of legal marriages, at least among the masses,
does not mean that the people do not establish durable and
lasting unions. Common-law marriages, or concubines may
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persist for years before financial circumstances permit the
expenses associated with a proper wedding. The result of this
type of social occurrence fosters attitudes of sexual per-
missiveness on the part of the Jamaican male. They in turn
serve to create a family environment in which the burden of
rearing children rests primarily upon the female members of
Jamaican society.
It has been widely noted that the dominant role women
play in rearing male children, coupled with the lack of social
stigma associated with sexual promiscuity has had dramatic
effects on the character of the Jamaican male. That is to
say the consequences of these social actions is to place
females in the role of the authoritative family figure as
well as giving an overall 'femine' character to Jamaican
society. As noted by Morris Cargil:
That although the boy may, and usually does, grow up into
a fine example of masculine physique, his attitude toward
life is extraordinarily female--his logic is not male
logic, his emotionalism tends to be a female emotionalism.
In addition to this, as he grows up and develops the
rejection of authority which is part of the normal pro-
cess, he has no father - figure against whom to rebel. So
his rebellion is against woman. Add to this that his
environment has led him to accept the woman as the bread-
winner, and you get a male who seldom quite ceases, sub-
consciously, to resent women, even when he loves them,
and who has no particular feeling of responsibility
towards them, in the sense that this is understood by the
Western male.
The evolution of social values born during the slave era
influences modern day values about the nature of work. It
is a widely held opinion that the task or job in which one
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is employed is a direct reflection upon his or her social
status. Positions which involve manual or hands-on labor are
uniformly viewed as less desirous than white collar positions
regardless of pay. Ira Reid notes in his book The Negro
Immigrant that "the West Indian black has had a long and
distinct aversion for manual labor". The desire to be
employed in a white collar position has caused many dis-
tortions in the work place. As evidenced by the growth in
government bureaucracies, at a time when the country must
often go abroad to impart needed technical expertise.
Jamaicans have a polychronic perception of time, that is
they tend to focus primarily upon the past and the future.
Consequently, interaction with foreigners, of culturally
different backgrounds, often produce difficulties as they
discover Jamaicans perceive and relate to time in a different
manner than most people of western culture. The traditional
Jamaican response to the question, when will the job be done,
or when will an expected event occur is "soon come". Edward
Hall in his book Beyond Culture , notes that cultural dif-
ferences are often seen by the way in which that culture
relates to time.
Hall describes a framework which can be used to help
categorize most cultures. The method he uses identifies two
extremes, one end is identified as low context while the
other is referred to as high context, with each exhibiting
certain unique traits. A low context culture is described
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as one which, tends to be organized around systems, emphasizes
linear concepts, holds reason and rationality in high regard,
prefers definite and distinct answers, seems to deal with
portions of the whole rather than the big picture, has a
limited institutionalized memory and has a monochronic focus
on time (emphasis on the present) . The low context culture
is characteristic of western cultures like the United States,
Germany, and Sweden. The other end of the cultural spectrum
is identified as a high context culture and is noted as having
the following attributes: Tends to be organized around people,
decisions are arrived at by consensus, individuals tend to
identify themselves by their relation to the group, and time
seems to be viewed in a polychronic manner, that is to say
the past and the future are emphasized over the present.
Countries like Russia, Argentina, and Japan are given as
examples of a high context culture. Although Jamaica doesn't
entirely fulfill all the criteria set forth, it does exhibit
many of the traits Hall describes as characteristic of a high
context culture.
In summation, Jamaica is a land whose people share a
common heritage. That climate, geography and history played
a major role in this formation seems undeniable. Furthermore,
these same factors emerge in formation of a national char-
acter, the peculiarities of which have been noted in this
chapter. In reiteration of some of the important elements
of national character, western culture sees the Jamaicans as
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a race who; originated from brutal beginnings, tends to have
a feminine disposition, perceives women as an authoritative
figure, has a general attitude of sexual permissiveness, that
tends to regard work more in terms of status than function,




In reiteration of the conclusions in chapter one, Prime
Minister Manley's adjustments in economic policies for
Government expenditures created massive deficits, high in-
flation and low domestic morale. It is evident that OPEC
price increases did contribute negatively to much of Jamaica's
economic problems. However, sound local economic policies
could have reduced the impact of OPEC price hikes, a solution
which eluded then Prime Minister Manley.
Chapter two provided computer simulations of eight dif-
ferent economic policy options. Simulation number one's
results verify that the CBI does provide Jamaica with the
necessary tools to escape from their dreary economic plight.
But this is only true if they remain within the specified
parameters of the model. So the bottom line question seems
to be whether or not Jamaicans can obtain an 8% rate of export
growth as determined by simulation number one (Table XXI).
This will no doubt depend upon a variety of factors some of
which have been considered in the course of this work, but
others unfortunately, will be obvious only from a historical
perspective. Nonetheless, those factors which have been
addressed seem to indicate Jamaicans are not culturally
restrained from attaining that level of productivity. In
fact, the West Indian black has demonstrated a remarkable
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ability to excel given the right circumstance. This can be
seen by viewing their economic performance when allowed to
immigrate to the United States. Consider for example, the
following statistics. "In 1969, black West Indians in the
United States earned 94% of the average income of America's
total populace. Remarkably, the second generation West
Indian earned 15% more than the average American. As further
testiment to their capabilities, more than 50% of all black
owned business in New York State are owned by blacks of West
Indian origin. Although it is recognized that qualifying for
immigration to the United States may place an individual in
an elite group among his countrymen. These statistics are
clearly not symptomatic of a people incapable of being
productive
.
There are still several unknown factors which could serve
to completely undermine these predictions and negate the CBI.
These factors, originate from both internal and external
sources. For the purposes of this discussion external factors
will be considered to remain constant. While internal factors
include such things as how accommodating the Jamaican govern-
ment remains in the view of international finances. For
example, a return to power of the PNP and Michael Manley
would effectively negate the impetus for the inflow of western
capital. The Jamaican political picture must remain stable
from an investor's viewpoint and that generally means a
government in power which is not hostile to western and
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democratic i.deals. In this light, the consequences of
internal elections could serve to completely forestall any
economic benefit the island would receive from the CBI.
Another internal variable of unpredictable consequence,
is the degree the present Seaga regime is prepared to go in
accommodating the inflow of free world capital. That is,
will investors and investment be greeted favorably by the
government, or will they encounter a plethora of red tape
and governemnt bureaucratic restrictions whose net result
would be to deter further investment. The reciprocity of the
Jamaican government to provide economic incentive to investors
would no doubt have an escalating effect upon the entire
economy. Conversely, any attempt to capitalize, on the part
of the government, and extract additional revenues from the
budding economic base would be extremely detrimental in the
long run.
The solution to this problem may be found in a more
rational approach, one in which, a profit-sharing or joint
ownership arrangement develops. The concept being to reward
both participants as productivity and profits rise. The
corporation receives an additional incentive by way of the
government now having a vested interest in the firm's future
profitability. This may also serve to help remove the stigma
that the multinationals or international investor was pro-
fiting at local expense. Additional economic incentives
should be afforded those investing bodies or corporations
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that develop training programs for local workers and employ
Jamaican managerial talent. The governing concept here
should be for the local institutes to develop programs that
foster mutually beneficial growth while avoiding the pre-
ception that the enrichment of one is at the expense of the
other
.
One final internal factor bares mentioning, namely, how
effectively the present Jamaican administration is at pla-
cating urban unrest. Finding solutions to these problems is
both difficult and volatile. This point is perhaps best
illustrated by the recent riots occurring in Kingston after
the government announced increases in the price of gasoline.
Although governmental response was rational and restrained,
the publicity generated certainly has had an adverse effect
on both the investment as well as the tourist community.
Jamaica's urban problems are compounded by the high unemployment
and the fact that over half of the population is under 20.
To forestall similar future occurrences, government policy
must not only find long term solutions to these problems, but
must adopt remedies to these problems which are perceived by
the masses as equitable.
Realizing that a friendly, economically stable Caribbean
could only serve to enhance U.S. interest, one final question
remains; namely, is the Caribbean Basin Initiative the optimum
means by which America can restore economic vitality to the
Caribbean region? Given that the program is a means to an
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end and not the end itself, it seems to be potentially the
best solution.
Just as the Marshall Plan revitalized an economically
devastated Europe at the end of World War II, so can the C.B.
rejuvenate the Caribbean Basin region. The U.S. approach
toward European restoration was absolute as can be clearly
seen by the commitment of virtually unlimited funds. The
return on investment was considerable, and few could argue
that without those massive allocations of aid the complexion
of Europe would be very different today. Although the
Caribbean hasn't suffered the ravages of war, it is similarly
in need of economic assistance. To approach this region with
any less resolve than we addressed post-war Europe postpones
the problem to a future date, at which time the ability to
control the outcome may be significantly less favorable.
Jamaica is an island undergoing a massive population
transition. The younger Jamaican population is presently
migrating from the rural districts to Kingston, and other
urban centers in search of work, which generally isn't
available. They form the nucleus for future political in-
stability. Unsatiated expectations for social improvement
or employment create a medium from which revolutions grow.
The options and therefore the success, with which the govern-
ment confronts this dilemma will in part be determined by the
country's economic well being. To avoid confronting this
situation merely postpones the inevitable, and ensures that,
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when they occur, the circumstances of confrontation will be
more violent and dramatic.
These disruptions to the political stability of friendly
Caribbean nations could have drastic consequences upon vital
U.S. security interests. The obvious geographical significance
of hostile nations so proximatous to America's vital sea lanes
impose a potentially calamitous situation. Historically,
we have been surrounded by nations that if not allied, were
at least not hostile to U.S. interest. What additional
security and economic costs would be imposed if the entire
Caribbean region were composed of communist satellite nations
like Cuba? In that regard, the future economic prospects of
our neighboring states assumes a vastly more consequential
role. Realistically, their economic vitality should be as
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